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Abstract 
Prisoners with a history of self-harm have reported experiencing more anger (e.g., 
Hilbrand, Krystal, Sharpe, & Foster, 1994), and despair (e.g., Shea, 1993), and less 
ability to cope (e.g., Shea, 1993; Liebling, 1992) than prisoners with no history of self-
harm. This suggests that intense negative affective experiences and less control over 
these states might be pervasive characteristics in individuals vulnerable to self-harm. The 
present study tested the hypotheses that high affect intensity, the tendency to experience 
both positive and negative emotional states intensely (Larsen & Diener, 1987), and 
deficits in negative affect regulation would be associated with self-harm behaviour. 
Twenty prisoners with a history of self-harm and twenty control prisoners rated 
emotional responsiveness on a modified version of the Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen 
& Diener, 1987), and the utility of strategies to decrease intense negative affective states 
on an affect regulation strategies checklist (ARSC). Prisoners with a history of self-harm 
reported experiencing significantly more intense levels of negative affect and less 
experience of serene states than control prisoners. Positive affect intensity levels did not 
differ between groups. The self-harm group reported utilising a significantly more 
varied, but less efficient, repertoire of affect regulation strategies. They also rated 
cognitive strategies significantly lower and aggressive strategies significantly higher. 
Results suggest that screening prisoners for intense negative emotional responsiveness 
and dysfunctional affect regulation may facilitate the identification and management of 
prisoners vulnerable to self-harm. Further research is required to validate the dimensions 
of the AIM(M) and the ARSC, and explore the mechanisms of intense negative affective 
experiences and self-harm behaviour. 
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CHAPTER ONE - SELF-HARM, AFFECT INTENSITY, 
AND AFFECT REGULATION 
The prevention of self-destructive acts is of particular concern to correctional providers 
who are legally responsible for prisoners' well-being. Moreover, suicide in prisons has become a 
source of public concern, particularly since the Royal Commission into Deaths in Custody in 
Australia that identified the need for strategies to reduce suicides in custodial settings (Biles & 
McDonald, 1992). Other self-destructive acts that occur in prison environments, such as 
attempted suicide and other forms of self-harm, equally warrant investigation so that strategies 
can be employed to reduce their prevalence. However, this task is particularly difficult because 
many stressors are commonly experienced in prison that could motivate a self-destructive act 
such as separation from family, criminal justice procedures (e.g., court appearances, sentencing, 
Parole-Board hearings), and dangers inherent in prison environments (e.g., personal threats, 
violence) (Toch,1992). It may well be important, therefore, to identify characteristic styles of 
responding to situational stressors that increase the likelihood of self-destructive behaviour. 
There has not been a great deal of research investigating individual difference 
characteristics discriminating prisoners vulnerable to suicide and self-harm. Studies that have 
examined records of prisoners who have committed suicide ( e.g., Topp, 1979; Dooley, 1990; 
Backett, 1987) have been limited to demographic, health, and criminological factors. These 
studies have not identified powerful predictive characteristics. Factors associated with suicide, 
such as a history of substance use, psychiatric disorder, and first time imprisoned, are also 
prevalent in the general prison population and are therefore limited in their utlity to identify those 
vulnerable to future suicidal behaviour. 
Research focussing on individuals who self-harm provides more scope for examining a 
broader range of variables such as characteristic affective experiences, cognitive processes and 
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behaviour. These factors can be examined when prisoners are received and provide insight into 
appropriate types of interventions and management styles for staff. Prisoners with a history of 
self-harm are also vulnerable to committing further acts of self-harm (e.g., Hillbrand, Krystal, 
Sharpe, & Foster, 1994; Morgan, Barton, Pottle, Pocock & Bums-Cox, 1976, Wanstall & Oei, 
1989) and suicide (e.g., Topp, 1979; Dooley, 1990; Backett, 1987), so strategies that assist 
prisoners vulnerable to self-harm will also assist in preventing suicides in prisons. 
In the present context, self-harm is defined as an act of self-inflicted and deliberate harm, 
regardless of whether death was the intended outcome. This definition therefore encompasses 
attempted suicide. Self-harm and attempted suicide are sometimes differentiated on the basis of 
intent to die ( e.g., Van Egmond & Diekstra, 1989), but this categorisation is not employed here as 
the purpose of this study is to examine pervasive factors that distinguish prisoners vulnerable to 
self-inflicted destructive behaviour, regardless of intended outcome. Previous research has also 
infrequently provided adequate definitions of self-harm behaviour. Where definitions have been 
given, they are indicated in the review below. 
A Behavioural Basis for Incidents of Self-harm 
Insight into the experiences associated with self-harm provides both an explanation for its 
incidence and a means of initial exploration of individual difference characteristics that may 
differentiate prisoners vulnerable to acts of self-harm. Studies such as those by Bach-y-rita 
(1974), Wanstall and Oei, (1989), and Pattison and Kahan (1993) have identified common 
patterns of self-reported negative affect prior to committing an act of self harm. Furthermore, 
this emotional experience is combined with negative cognition such as an inability to divert 
attention from negative situations. These studies have also suggested that there are some 
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immediate positive consequences of self-harm behaviour, such as emotional relief, thereby 
reinforcing these acts and providing a behavioural basis for their incidence. 
Factors that maintain self-harm behaviour have been described by Bach-y-Rita (1974) 
who assessed eight men who had committed multiple acts of self-harm in a special prison unit for 
violent offenders. The men sometimes reported that they attempted to manipulate their 
circumstances by committing acts of self-harm, although each of them reported feeling depressed 
prior to these acts and relief afterwards. Self-harm occurred more while in isolation, when 
external controls (presumably constraints imposed by their situation in prison) evoked 
frustration, and when the men could not act on their feelings. Self-harm, therefore, provided 
resolution to negative emotional states and situations, but was enacted when limitations restricted 
the means available for responding to these situational stressors. 
A more comprehensive examination of factors associated with self-harm was conducted 
by W anstall and Oei ( 1989) who reviewed literature examining the psychological aspects of 
'delicate wrist-cutting behaviour' in adult psychiatric patients. This is the most common form of 
self-harm and refers to the act of deliberately inflicting superficial delicate incisions, generally on 
the wrist. Their review also suggested that learning theory explains the incidence of delicate 
wrist-cutting as common patterns of antecedents and consequences were associated with the acts. 
Antecedents to self-harm included patients becoming increasingly tense and anxious, and then 
gradually isolating themselves and becoming self-absorbed. Consequences of self-harm included 
relief of tension, feelings of relaxation, pleasure in seeing blood, and attention from staff. These 
consequences would appear to, at least in some cases, reduce the intense negative affect, modify 
cognition, and change negative aspects of their situation preceding self-harm, thus reinforcing 
subsequent acts. 
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Similar factors were recognised by Pattison and Kahan (1993), who examined fifty-six 
published cases of low lethality self-harm. They identified four predominant psychological 
factors experienced prior to an act of self-harm; namely despair ( defined as an intolerable 
emotion), anxiety, anger, and cognitive constriction. Although they did not specify how these 
experiences were assessed, their review suggested that prior to an act of self-harm individuals 
experience negative affective states and an inability to divert or modify cognition from the 
negative aspects of their situation and motivation to self-harm. Seventy percent of the case 
studies demonstrated despair prior to an act of self-harm suggesting that, consistent with 
experiences common to individuals who commit suicide (Shneidman, 1989), intense 
psychological pain is generally experienced prior to an act of self-harm. Pattison and Kahan 
state,d that these psychological factors were relatively consistent amongst those who committed 
single and multiple acts of self-harm, suggesting that intense negative affect and cognitive 
constriction are factors which are important in the incidence of self-harm, regardless of the 
history of the behaviour. 
The above studies suggest that negative affective experiences may play an important role 
in precipitating acts of self-harm. Dysfunctional cognitive processes, such as focussing on 
negative situations, and certain behaviours, such as social isolation, may also be pivotal. 
Behaviour theory offers a frame-work to explain how various factors reinforce the incidence of 
self-harm as a response to stressors that elicit negative affect and negative cognition. The 
importance of reinforcing factors is exemplified in therapy styles which emphasise identifying 
antecedent and consequent conditions to self-harm incidents, and developing alternative 
behaviours to replace self-harm when antecedent factors occur. Shearin and Linehan (1994), for 
example, found that self-harm incidents were reduced in clients with borderline personality 
disorder undertaking this type of therapy compared to clients receiving other types of therapy. 
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Psychological Processes and Self-harm 
Consistent with the notion that self-harm occurs as a maladaptive response to stressors, 
Liebling ( 1992) has suggested that prisoners who self-harm can be differentiated from other 
prisoners on the basis of coping skills. She compared fifty juvenile prisoners who required 
hospital treatment due to acts of self-harm with a random sample of fifty juvenile prisoners with 
no record of self-harm on a range of criminological and demographic variables. The groups did 
not differ in age, ethnicity, and offences, but those who had engaged in self-harm also received 
more psychiatric treatment, had greater drinking problems, and fewer friends. Semi-structured 
interviews suggested that juveniles with a history of self-harm could be differentiated from the 
control group by the extent of background deprivation reported, and an inability to cope with the 
prison environment because of conflict with inmates and less contact with families in the prison 
setting. She proposed that stressful situations, such as receiving an unexpectedly long sente.nce 
or separating from a partner, combined with an inability to problem-solve, propelled inmates 
toward suicidal behaviour. However, problem solving ability or other skills to manage stressors, 
were not compared between groups using standardised measures. 
Toch (1992) reported extensively on the types of strategies that prisoners use to cope with 
imprisonment. He interviewed over three-hundred prisoners in New York correctional facilities 
who were known to have committed acts of self-harm or attempted suicide, and compared this 
group with a smaller control group matched for age and ethnicity. Prisoners were interviewed 
regarding their responses to crises experienced within prison. Three types of personal break-
downs, resulting in incidents of self-harm, were identified, namely, problems with the prison 
environment (e.g., an inability to tolerate specific placements, such as solitary confinement), 
perceived personal inadequacies ( e.g., feelings of worthlessness associated with criminal 
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careers), and a lack of impulse control (e.g., rage). Toch proposed that control prisoners had 
survived stress by 'harnessing' rather than being controlled by it. They achieved this by 
employing supports (e.g., confiding in trusted friends), suppressing involvement with the outside, 
taking a detached stance, using distraction, or shutting off negative affect when crises arose. 
However Toch, like Liebling (1992), employed semi-structured interviews and did not assess 
whether prisoners with a history of self-harm could be differentiated from other prisoners on the 
basis of deficits in utilising these strategies. 
The mechanisms of suicidal behaviour, including self-harm, were more 
specifically explored by Ivanoff and Jang ( 1991) who used a number of standardised 
measures. They examined the relationship between hopelessness, social desirability, and 
a range of criminological factors in a sample of 130 prisoners. Four groups of prisoners 
participated: prisoners who had inflicted self-harm within the past year, prisoners who 
had inflicted self-harm at some time but not in the previous year, prisoners with a history 
of a psychiatric disorder, and a control group of prisoners that had no history of suicidal 
behaviour or contact with prison mental health services. These groups were administered 
the Scale for Suicidal Ideation (SSI) (Beck, Kovacs, & Weissman, 1979) that comprises 
subscales of suicidal desire (the degree, frequency, and duration of suicidal thoughts), and 
suicidal preparation (suicidal preoccupations such as methods of self-harm and factors 
that provoke or deter self-harm incidents); the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) (Beck, 
Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974) (that measures cognition associated with pessimism); 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendleson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961); 
the Edwards Social Desirability Scale (Edwards, 1970); the Suicidal Behaviours 
Interview adapted from the Suicidal Behaviors Questionnaire (Linehan & Nielson, 1981); 
and the Life Experiences Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). A multivariate 
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causal model was devised using the ordinary least squares regression method. Various 
factors, such as length of sentence and number of negative life events, indirectly affected 
suicidal factors (previous suicidal behaviour, current suicidal ideation and anticipated 
suicidal behaviour) by increasing levels of depression or hopelessness. For example, 
inmates with a history of juvenile delinquency and violent crimes had elevated levels of 
depression and showed more current suicidal ideation. Social desirability had no direct 
effect on suicidal factors or on hopelessness, but higher levels of social desirability were 
associated with low levels of depression. Hopelessness and social desirability interacted 
in that the ability of hopelessness to predict suicidal behaviour decreased as levels of 
social desirability increased. The relationship between individuals' tendency to act in a 
socially desirable manner and self-harm, therefore, seems to be consolidated by 
pessimism and concomitant feelings of hopelessness in response to negative life events, 
although the dimensions of social desirability in this study were not clearly defined. 
Results suggest, however, that there may be utility in identifying various dysfunctional 
cognitive styles that occur when negative affective states are elevated to predict suicidal 
behaviour, 
To test the transactional theory that suicidal behaviour is associated with a predisposition 
to dysfunctional cognitive processing, Schmidtke and Schaller ( 1992) administered various 
measures to assess whether individuals with a history of attempted suicide perceived their 
environment as undifferentiated, inarticulated and global. This theory suggests that individuals 
are prone to commit suicide when a rigid and indiscriminate cognitive style is coupled with 
negative situational factors that result in the individual believing their situation is unchangeable 
and ill fated. Patients admitted to a psychiatric ward after a suicide attempt and groups of 
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psychiatric and normal controls were assessed at three times. The suicide group was tested 
within a week of the attempted suicide, approximately twenty days later, and on discharge. Three 
cognitive styles were investigated, namely, cognitive rigidity, dichotomous thinking, and field 
dependence (although no details of these terms were provided). A German version of the Stroop 
test was used to assess cognitive rigidity, a semantic differential task (Neuringer, 1961) was used 
to assess dichotomous thinking, and field dependence was assessed in a group embedded figures 
task (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). The Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), the Eysenk Personality Inventory (Eysenk & Eysenk, 1964 ), and the 
Beck Depression Inventory were also administered. Results indicated that both clinical groups 
were more rigid thinkers and had greater field dependence than the normal controls at initial 
testing but not at subsequent testing. Measures of dichotomous thinking did not differ between 
the groups. Depressive symptoms, emotional !ability, state anxiety and trait anxiety did not differ 
between the clinical groups, but were significantly higher than normal controls at initial testing. 
These affective states, including trait anxiety, decreased significantly for both clinical groups 
over the measurement period to the same level as controls. Schmidtke and Schaller concluded 
that their results did not support the transactional theory that suicidal individuals are generally 
predisposed to global or rigid thinking, as significant improvements in rigid thinking and field 
dependence were demonstrated when emotional states returned to normal levels. However, this 
does not preclude the possibility that individuals who self-harm have a propensity towards 
experiencing intense depression and anxiety, which then affects cognitive processes, when 
situational stressors occur. 
The association between suicidal behaviour and poor interpersonal problem-solving was 
examined by Schotte, Cools and Payvar ( 1990) in 36 consecutive inpatients to a psychiatric ward 
who reported suicidal ideation. Thirty-nine percent had made an attempt prior to admission and 
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almost a fifth had a history of previous attempts. Participants were tested either on admission 
and a week later, or only a week later, to assess possible practice effects. The Beck Depression 
Inventory, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, the Beck Hopelessness Scale, the Scale for Suicidal 
Ideation, and the Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedure (MEPS) (Platt, Spivack, & Bloom, 
1975), that presents stories that require participants to specify means of interpersonal problem-
solving, were administered. Participants tested both times showed significant improvement on 
each of the measures, including interpersonal problem-solving ability, over time. The group 
tested twice and the group tested only a week later performed equally well a week after 
admission, suggesting that improvements were not accounted for by practice effects. Consistent 
with Schmidtke and Schaller ( 1992), these results also suggested that deficits in cognitive 
processing were not traits associated with individuals vulnerable to suicidal behaviour, although 
high states of negative affect were associated with deficits in cognition. Schotte et al. suggested, 
therefore, that a state vulnerability model, as opposed to a trait vulnerability model, better 
explained the results of their study. This assertion, however, ignores the possibility that suicidal 
behaviour might instead be associated with a predisposition to emotional dysregulation, that 
affects cognitive processing when negative affective states are high. 
Ivanoff, Smyth, Grochowski, Jang and Klein ( 1992) also investigated interpersonal 
problem-solving skills and self-harm in ninety-three prisoners with and without a history of self-
harm. Prisoners with a history of self-harm were further divided into those with and without 
current suicidal ideation. Ivanoff et al. administered the MEPS, the BDI, the BHS and the Prison 
Suicidal Behaviours Interview. Currently suicidal individuals with a history of self-harm differed 
significantly from comparison groups on measures of hopelessness and depression, however, 
there was no difference between any of the groups in their problem-solving ability. Unlike 
Schotte et al.' s ( 1990) results, MEPS scores did not vary according to levels of hopelessness and 
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depression although participants in the Schotte, et al. study demonstrated higher levels of 
negative affective states. Ivanoff et al. suggested that problem-solving ability does not seem to 
predispose individuals to suicidal ideation although immediately prior to an act of self-harm, 
distress may reach a level that affects problem-solving ability. Alternatively, the MEPS may not 
have been sensitive in discriminating interpersonal problem-solving skills in their sample given. 
A prison sample might not have easily identified with the problems presented in the MEPS. 
Although deficits in interpersonal problem-solving ability might not be a pervasive factor 
discriminating prisoners vulnerable to self-harm, Hillbrand et al. (1994) found that self-harm was 
associated with aggression. Fifty male forensic inpatients who had engaged in at least one self-
harm incident scored significantly higher on outward directed aggression compared to fifty 
co~parison forensic patients, as assessed by the Overt Aggression Scale (Yudofsky, Silver, 
Jackson, Endicott, & Williams, 1986). More verbal aggression and physical aggression against 
objects and people were reported in the self-harm group, suggesting that demonstration of these 
behaviours may indicate vulnerablity to self-harm. This finding is also consistent with 
conceptualising self-harm as indicative of a pervasive means of responding dysfunctionally to 
stressors. 
A broader examination of personality factors related to self-harm was undertaken by Shea 
(1993) who explored the association between self-harm and scores on sub-scales of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The MMPI was administered to thirty 
prisoners with a history of self-harm and thirty control prisoners who were matched for age, race 
and IQ. The self-harm group comprised individuals who had experienced at least two self-harm 
incidents that were assessed as low lethality, required medical attention, and were documented by 
prison officials. The control group was selected from referrals for psychological evaluations for 
reasons other than self-harm. Focussing on clinical scales which were significantly different at 
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the .001 level, as thirteen scales were compared using t-tests, the self-harm group were 
significantly higher on three scales. These scales were depression, psychasthenia ( anxiety and 
obsessive thinking), and social introversion. The self-harm group's scores, therefore, reflected a 
greater experience of distress, manifested by feelings of anxiety, depression and persecution; and 
a perception that they had fewer resources to deal with their problems. Responses also suggested 
that they experienced significantly more self and other alienation and feelings of isolation and 
withdrawal. Impulsive behaviour was also reported more by the self-harm group compared to 
control group prisoners. Prisoners with a history of self-harm, therefore, may be differentiated 
from other prisoners on their more frequent experience of extreme negative affect, a tendency to 
perceive themselves as less able to deal with stressors, and more impulsive and socially 
withdrawn behaviour. These results provide some detail as to the profile of prisoners vulnerable 
to self-harm on the basis of a standardised measure, although discriminating characteristics, such 
as alienation and poor resourcefulness, are complex factors. The aspects of these characteristics 
that would indicate vulnerability to self-harm require exploration. Identifying the specific factors 
would circumvent the laborious task of administering the MMPI to identify prisoners at risk of 
self-harm. In addition, although Shea's research suggests that problems in emotional and social 
functioning may be paramount in discriminating risk, classification analyses were not conducted 
on the data suggesting that validation of these results is required. 
Intense and frequent negative affective states, primarily depression, hopelessness, anxiety, 
and anger, are invariably associated with self-harm. These experiences are commonly reported 
by individuals prior to acts of self-harm (e.g., Pattison & Kahan, 1993) and are generally 
significantly higher as assessed by standardised measures (e.g., Shea, 1993) in self-harm or other 
suicidal behaviour groups compared to control groups. Poor problem-solving (Schotte et al .. , 
1990) and other cognitive deficits (e.g., Schmidtke & Schaller, 1992) have also been 
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demonstrated following acts of self-harm. However, these cognitive functions have improved 
significantly when negative affective states have decreased, or are not evident if affective states 
are not sufficiently intense (Ivanoff et al., 1992). Aggressive (Hillbrand et al., 1994) and 
impulsive (Shea, 1993) behaviour have also been self-reported as significantly more common in 
individuals with a history of self-harm suggesting this group engages in more pervasive 
dysfunctional behaviour, in addition to self-harm. Although Liebling ( 1992) and Toch ( 1992) 
have suggested that poor coping differentiates self-harm groups from control groups, these 
conclusions have not been made on the basis of standardised measures and hence require 
systematic examination to ascertain discriminating factors. Shea (1993) and Ivanoff and Jang 
( 1991) have taken measures of self-harm groups' perception of coping resources and social 
desirability, respectively, although again the dimensions comprising these factors have not been 
adequately articulated to identify an individual difference characteristic that provides utility for 
devising specific assessment and intervention strategies. 
Although intense negative affective states are not consistently present in those 
who attempt suicide (e.g. Schmidtke & Shaller, 1992; Schotte et al., 1990), they might 
nonetheless be experienced more frequently and be associated with a pattern of 
dysfunctional responding, increasing vulnerability to future acts. Characteristic 
experiences of intense negative affect and a lack of effective strategies to reduce these 
aversive states might therefore discriminate prisoners vulnerable to self-harm. An 
individual difference factor that might be important in this respect is affect intensity. 
Affect Intensity 
Affect intensity describes the typical level of intensity experienced by individuals in 
emotional situations and hence is a pervasive characteristic that might serve as a useful factor to 
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identify prisoners vulnerable to self-harm behaviour. Larsen and Diener (1987) have proposed 
that some individuals typically experience both positive and negative emotions intensely (ie., 
have high affect intensity), while others experience more subdued emotional responsiveness (ie., 
have low affect intensity). 
Larsen and Diener ( 1987) suggested that affect intensity functions as a means of 
regulating arousal and that differences exist in the methods by which individuals regulate arousal 
depending on predispositions to under-arousal and over-arousal. They review research 
suggesting that those who experience high affect intensity are under-aroused at baseline levels, so 
increases in emotional responsiveness enable optimal levels of arousal to be achieved. The 
opposite is true for individuals who experience low affect intensity as increases in emotional 
responsiveness are not required to increase arousal, due to over-arousal at baseline levels. 
The affect intensity construct was developed by assessing the intensity of positive and 
negative emotional responses using affect adjective check-lists daily over a period of weeks. 
Larsen and Diener ( 1987) reported that across four different studies of daily mood, a correlation 
of between .70 and .77 was found between positive and negative emotions. Thus they proposed 
that affect intensity is a uni-dimensional construct. To circumvent the laborious task of 
calculating daily mood over a long period of time, Larsen and Diener ( 1987) devised an affect 
intensity measure, the AIM. 
The AIM is a 40-item questionnaire that assesses an individual's typical intensity of 
emotional responsiveness. Items refer to specific subjective experiences of positive affect, such 
as 'When I accomplish something difficult I feel delighted or elated', and negative affect, such as 
'Sad movies deeply touch me'. Several items assess high levels of arousal, such as 'My heart 
races at the anticipation of some exciting event', and several reversed items assess low levels of 
arousal, such as 'When I'm happy it's a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than being 
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zestful and aroused'. Participants are required to indicate on a six-point Likert-type scale how 
frequently these experiences have occurred for them, from Never to Always. AIM scores are 
then calculated by obtaining the mean value of the forty items. Global measures are proposed as 
an index of the level of affect intensity for both positive and negative affective experiences. 
In reviewing research pertaining to the reliability of the AIM, Larsen and Diener ( 1987) 
reported that test/retest reliability varied from approximately .80 over one to three months, to .75 
for a two-year period. The AIM, therefore, seems to be reliable in that its assessment of an 
individual's affect intensity level is consistent over time. Such temporal reliability is consistent 
with the notion that affect intensity is a stable temperament characteristic. 
AIM scores correlate with individuals' emotional responsiveness to daily events 
providing support for the validity of the AIM as a measure of typical experience of emotional 
intensity. Larsen, Diener and Emmons ( 1986) conducted a study in which 176 undergraduates 
completed the AIM and rated a 30-item Event Reaction Questionnaire, that described positive 
and negative daily events previously identified by college students. Participants were asked to 
rate their emotional reaction to each event using a ten-point scale that went from extreme 
positive emotions (e.g., euphoria) to extreme negative emotions (e.g., despair). Analysis of 
Variance CANOVA) comparing the highest and lowest quartile of AIM scoring participants 
demonstrated that high AIM scorers reported both good and bad events as eliciting significantly 
more intense emotional responsiveness than low AIM scorers, and there was no interaction. 
These results support the validity of the AIM as a measure of the typical intensity of affective 
experiences to emotional situations. 
Larsen et al. (1986) administered three additional measures in this study to examine the 
relationship between affect intensity and arousability, sensation-seeking, and emotional 
reactivity. These were the Stimulus Screening Scale (Mehrabian, 1979), that measured the 
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ability to screen irrelevant sensory stimuli and hence assessed susceptibility to arousal, the 
Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1979), that measured the tendency to seek out situations 
that provide high levels of stimulation, and the Reactivity sub-scale of the Mood Survey 
(Underwood & Froming, 1980) that measured mood variability. AIM scores correlated with 
measures of arousability (! = .32) and emotional reactivity(!= .25) suggesting that participants 
with high affect intensity were more easily aroused and experienced more mood variability. AIM 
scores did not correlate with sensation seeking(!= -.001) suggesting that individuals' affect 
intensity was not associated with initiating behaviour for emotional stimulation. Affect intensity 
was therefore associated with frequency of emotional reactions and arousability, but is distinct 
from these because it describes characteristic intensity of responses rather than frequency of 
affective experiences. 
Larsen, Diener and Cropanzano (1987) investigated cognitive processes associated with 
depression (Beck, 1976) and affect intensity. Three categories of cognition were assessed, 
namely, personalisation, or self-referential cognition; selective abstraction, in which cognition 
focuses on the emotion-provoking aspects of events; and overgeneralisation, in which a general 
state of affairs is construed from a single event. In their first study, 280 undergraduates 
completed the AIM and were exposed to a series of slides classified as negative, neutral and 
positive, although no manipulation check was conducted to assess the validity of these 
classifications. When viewing the slides, participants indicated their agreement with nine 
statements, three derived from each of the cognitive categories. Approximately half of the 
statements separated high and low quartile AIM scorers in a step-wise discriminant function 
analysis for positive (Wilk's Lambda= .84) and negative slides (Wilk's Lambda= .74). In both 
analyses, the high AIM scorers were more likely to think about how they felt (personalise), to 
focus on the best or worst part of the slide (selectively abstract), and to think about how good or 
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evil the world is (generalise) in response to the slides. These results suggest that there is an 
association between experiencing affect intensely and cogitating on the nature of events and/or 
self, in response to emotion provoking situations. 
In their second study Larsen et al. (1987) administered the AIM to 109 undergraduate 
participants and asked them to write down any thoughts or other reactions experienced while 
viewing a sub-set of slides from the first study. Four raters then classified participants' responses 
into one of eight categories for comparison between high and low AIM groups. The three 
cognitive categories outlined above were subdivided into more specific categories. 
Personalisation comprised 'personalising' and 'empathic statements'; overgeneralisation 
comprised 'global statements' and 'fantasy elaboration'; and selective abstraction comprised 
'foe:us on feelings' and 'emotional details', although on what basis these categories were 
determined was not clear. Two further categories, 'physical sensations' and 'emotional arousal', 
were also used as a manipulation check. T-tests confirmed that significantly more emotional 
responses to the positive and negative slides were elicited overall compared to the neutral slides. 
Response categories discriminated the highest 27 and the lowest 21 AIM scorers for positive 
(except for 'focus on feelings' and 'emotional details' categories) and negative (except for the 
'emotional details' category) slides. High AIM scoring participants were more likely to 
experience personalisation and overgeneralisation but their experience of selective abstraction 
was similar to the low scoring AIM group. Some differences in cognition are therefore apparent 
between those who experience high and low affect intensity when they are exposed to positive 
and negative emotion eliciting stimuli. The consequences of these cognitive processes were not 
explored although, because the categories described processes experienced in depression, 
possible negative consequences might be prolonging intense negative experiences and an 
inability to enact other actitivities. 
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Affect intensity is thus proposed as a pervasive characteristic whereby individuals with 
high affect intensity tend to experience positive and negative emotions more intensely than those 
who are low on affect intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987). The immediate consequences for 
individuals who experience high affect intensity include high levels of physiological arousal and 
strong subjective experiences of emotion when emotion-provoking stimuli are experienced. 
Characteristic intensity of affective experiences is also associated with the frequency of 
emotional reactions and arousability but is theoretically distinct from these (Larsen et al., 1986). 
Particular cognitive experiences, such as personalisation and overgeneralisation, have also been 
demonstrated in individuals high on affect intensity in response to emotional stimuli (Larsen, et 
al., 1987). Sensation-seeking behaviour is not associated with affect intensity (Larsen et al., 
1986), and other behavioural responses associated with affect intensity have not been explored. 
Larsen and Diener (1987), however, have also noted that an individual's subjective well-
being is determined by the frequency of affective experiences in conjunction with the intensity 
with which they are experienced, or the ratio of positive to negative affect experienced over time. 
In this respect, individuals who encounter frequent negative events will experience varying 
subjective well-being depending on their level of affect intensity. Individuals in this position 
who are high in affect intensity will experience acute and agitated negative affect, distress, and 
depression whereas individuals who are low in affect intensity will experience milder but 
persistent unhappiness. Conversely, if relatively frequent positive affective experiences are 
encountered, subjective well-being for individuals who are high in affect intensity will 
incorporate feelings such as exuberance and joyfulness compared to those who are low in affect 
intensity, who will experience contentment and serenity. 
Therefore, the nature and frequency of affective experiences determines an individual's 
overall well-being, and affect intensity mediates the character of those experiences. An 
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additional factor that impinges on well-being, however, concerns the nature of responses elicited 
to intense negative affect, and their consequences for reducing these states. The identification of 
functional responses to reduce aversive states has been explored in the area of coping. Although 
the vast literature on coping has not conclusively identified the dimensions involved in 
responding to negative situations (See Parker & Endler, 1992, for a review), it has provided some 
insight into strategies invoked to regulate negative affect and their consequences for subjective 
well being. This issue is particularly important in the context of investigating individual 
difference characteristics that might discriminate vulnerability to self-harm in that those who 
engage in self-harm might have a dysfunctional response style to negative affective states. 
Coping and Affect Regulation 
Coping refers to the various responses an individual employs to manage negative 
situational stressors, including the affects of these such as distress. When intense negative 
affective experiences are encountered as a result of stressors, various experiences may occur. 
These include subjective emotional experiences, such as depression, anxiety and anger, arousal 
responses, such as shaking and increased respiration, (Larsen & Diener, 1987), and various 
cognitive processes, such as focussing on the nature of the stimuli (Larsen et al., 1987). As 
suggested above, the typical intensity of affect experienced in conjunction with the frequency of 
situational stressors determines subjective well-being. However, this assertion does not take 
account of individual differences in the types of responses elicited to reduce negative affective 
experiences. Parker and Endler (1992) have proposed that the strategies employed in response to 
reactions to negative situational stressors determine subjective well-being, such as psychological 
distress and somatic complaints and, subsequently, whether individuals are 'good' or 'bad' 
copers. Toch ( 1992) also identified important differences in coping ability when he concluded 
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that prisoners who did not self-harm or attempt suicide in response to prison crises 'harnessed' 
stress, rather than were controlled by it. To do this they employed various strategies that 
included social support or being emotionally detached from problems. Subjective well-being, 
therefore, might be determined by either not experiencing intense negative affect frequently 
and/or by responding with functional strategies when intense negative affective states occur. 
Parker and Endler (1992) have suggested that the types of responses employed by 
individuals to cope with negative situational stressors have been categorised into two main 
dimensions. They reviewed thirteen measures in the coping literature and found that nine 
identified emotion-focused coping and problem-focused coping as central mechanisms. Parker 
and Endler stated that emotion-focused coping refers to emotional responses, self pre-occupation, 
and fantasising, whereas problem-focused coping refers to responses used to solve a problem or 
cognitively reframe it. A number of additional constructs have been proposed, such as 
avoidance-focussed coping that involves employing strategies to distract attention from the 
source of stress. However, no consensus exists on the structure of coping or even the elements 
that comprise the various types of coping. Parker and Endler suggested that the coping literature 
has had limited theoretical and empirical advances due to the psychometric inadequacies of 
measures used. The number of scales alone in the thirteen measures they examined ranged from 
three to twelve, which has limited the validity and generalisability of results. Such disparity 
within the field of coping exemplifies the complexity of responses that can be initiated in 
response to stressors. An alternative approach, rather than attempting to encompass all types of 
responses, is to limit the scope under examination. One such limitation is to focus on responses 
directed to the reduction of aversive emotional states. 
Affect regulation in the current context concerns strategies employed to reduce any type 
of negative affective state, that primarily includes experiences such as stress or other symptoms 
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of anxiety (such as those concerned with arousal), depression, and anger. This is conceptually 
different from coping, which has primarily focussed on the relationship between situational 
stressors and strategies in response to these, rather than the reduction of negative affective 
experiences specifically. Miller's (1992) review of research on coping with health problems, 
however, has provided some insight into individual differences in coping that relate to the notion 
of affect regulation. She has suggested that certain strategies transfer focus from the threatening 
aspects of a situation, so that stress can be reduced. Her review suggested that individuals who 
used strategies that diverted attention from the source of stress and modulated internal arousal, 
such as using relaxation techniques or reinterpreting the situation, most effectively achieved the 
regulation of stress. These strategies enabled aversive events to be processed more efficiently 
because anxiety was reduced. Individuals who focussed on aspects of a threatening situation and 
tended to spend less time averting attention away from their situation maintained high levels of 
stress. However, Miller noted that the effectiveness of these strategies varied depending on the 
degree of control participants could exercise over their situation. Where control existed, 
focussing attention on the threatening aspects of a situation and seeking information on the 
source of a stressor had a positive effect on reducing stress. 
Functional means of reducing intense negative affect therefore includes strategies that 
avoid and reinterpret the threatening aspects of stressors that cannot be controlled, and 
addressing issues concerned with a stressor where control can be exerted, to assist in alleviating 
subjective emotional experiences and arousal responses. The identification of prisoners who do 
not have an effective repertoire of strategies enabling the alleviation of intense negative affective 
states might therefore assist in identifying vulnerability to self-harm. 
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The Present Study 
The research reviewed on self-harm suggests that self-harm incidents are associated with 
intense negative affect such as depression, hopelessness and anger (e.g., Pattison & Kahan, 
1993). Individuals with a history of self-harm have also reported experiencing greater distress 
and less ability to deal with their problems (e.g., Shea, 1993), have a greater tendency to be 
impulsive (e.g., Shea, 1993), while also employing more dysfunctional behaviour such as social 
withdrawal (e.g. Shea, 1993), and acts of aggression (e.g., Hillbrand et al., 1994), compared to 
those with no history of self-harm. The factors that mediate intense negative affect and 
subsequent dysfunctional behaviour are not clear, although various cognitive states such as high 
levels of hopelessness (a significant aspect of this state is pessimistic cognition), rigid thinking 
(e.g., Schmidtke & Shaller, 1992), and poor interpersonal problem-solving (e.g., Schotte et al., 
1990) have been associated with self-harm behaviour. These dysfunctional cognitive processes, 
however, have not been demonstrated when affective states were not at intense levels. This 
suggests that individuals vulnerable to self-harm migght have a tendency to experience intense 
emotional responsiveness and hence have high levels of affect intensity. This tendency might 
also be coupled with problems eliciting functional affect regulation strategies when experiencing 
intense negative affect, resulting in patterns of dysfunctional, including harmful, means of 
reducing aversive states. 
The present study was devised to test the hypotheses that high affect intensity and 
dysfunctional affect regulation strategies are associated with self-harm in prisoners. If supported, 
this hypothesis suggests that assessing characteristic emotional responsiveness and use of affect 
regulation strategies might assist in the identification of prisoners at risk of self-harm, and 
provide a basis for the formulation of intervention and management plans in vulnerable 
prisoners. Specifically, prisoners with a history of self-harm were expected to score higher on a 
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measure of affect intensity than prisoners with no history of self-harm, and employ fewer 
functional strategies to regulate affect. They were expected to be deficient in cognitive processes 
to reduce intense negative affect, engage in less social interaction during these states, and employ 
fewer distraction techniques to avert from negative situational stressors. More use of aggression 
to decrease intense negative affect was also expected by the self-harm group. 
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CHAPTER TWO - PILOT STUDY 
It was necessary to review the existing measure of affect intensity, the AIM (Larsen & 
Diener, 1987), for use in the present study because it has demonstrated variability in the number 
of factors produced (e.g., Weinfurt, Bryant & Yarnold, 1994). The style oflanguage used in the 
AIM was also reviewed for its appropriateness with a prison sample. No measures of affect 
regulation were found for the present study, so existing coping measures (e.g., the Ways of 
Coping Checklist (WCC), Folkman and Lazarus, 1985; the Cybernetic Coping Scale (CCS), 
Edwards & Baglioni, 1993) were reviewed as they contain items concerned with decreasing 
intense negative affect. These measures, however, include other responses to negative situations 
that are not directed towards reducing intense negative affect, nor have they demonstrated 
adequate reliability and validity (e.g., See Parker & Endler, 1992). 
The first phase of the present research, therefore, involved the development of 
appropriate measures of affect intensity and affect regulation for use with a prison sample. This 
involved initially restructuring items in the AIM (Larsen & Diener, 1987) to suit the prison 
population, and administering this modified version to a small prison sample. Prisoners in this 
sample were then asked to elicit strategies that described the methods they used to regulate affect, 
and to discuss the utility of various categories of strategies derived from coping (e.g., Folkman 
and Lazarus, 1985; Edwards & Baglioni, 1993) and self-harm literature (e.g., Shea, 1993; 
Hillbrand et al., 1994). Items in the modified affect intensity measure were then refined and a 
checklist of affect regulation strategies constructed. Scales were derived for items in both 
measures based on previous research suggesting that affect intensity (Weinfurt et al., 1994) and 
affect regulation (Fokman & Lazarus, 1985; Edwards & Baglioni, 1993; Miller, 1992) are multi-
dimensional constructs. The reliability of these scales was assessed using an independent rater. 
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Dimensions of Affect Intensity 
The assumption that affect intensity is a unidimensional construct and the use of global 
AIM scores as a means of assessing affect intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987) have been 
challenged by Weinfurt et al. (1994). They used confirmatory factor analysis to test two models 
of affect intensity, a one dimensional model, as proposed by Larsen and Diener, and a four 
dimensional model, as suggested in other research they reviewed. They also used exploratory 
principal components analysis to examine a model of best fit. Analyses were conducted on AIM 
scores from 673 undergraduate students, and it was found that the data best fitted a four-factor 
model. The four factors were positive affectivity (positive affect with high arousal, such as 
happiness), negative intensity (negative affect in general, such as sadness, and with high arousal, 
such as anxiety), serenity (positive affect with low arousal, such as relaxation) and negative 
reactivity (reactions to negative situational stressors, such as sad movies). Chronbach's alpha 
levels for the four factors varied between .75 and .90 suggesting adequate to very good internal 
consistency in each factor. The inter-correlation between these factors demonstr.ated that they 
were relatively unrelated (mean phi co-efficient = .26) suggesting that affect intensity is not a 
unidimensional construct. Weinfurt et al. therefore proposed that it is inappropriate to rely on 
global AIM scores alone and the use of separate sub-scales in research on affect intensity is 
necessary. The present study therefore employed these four factors as sub-scales to undertake a 
more valid assessment of affect intensity. 
Dimensions of Affect Regulation 
Questionnaires that assess coping examine the frequency of various types of responses 
made by individuals to stressful situations. Numerous coping questionnaires have sought to 
encompass the range of responses enacted (See Parker & Endler, 1992), however, the present 
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study required a measure to specifically assess strategies aimed at reducing intense negative 
affective states. Although both coping and affect regulation refer to responses that occur to 
manage the experiences encountered when negative situations arise, affect regulation focuses on 
the utility of strategies employed to reduce elicited intense negative affect. The conceptual 
similarities between coping and affect regulation, however, also suggested that an examination of 
the types of items and scales included in coping questionnaires might assist the process of 
developing a checklist of affect regulation strategies. 
Two relevant coping questionnaires that incorporate strategies used to reduce negative 
affect are the Ways of Coping Check-list (WCC) (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), and the Cybernetic 
Coping Scale (CCS) (Edwards & Baglioni, 1993). The WCC was selected as it has probably 
been the most widely used measure in coping research (Parker & Endler, 1992), suggesting that 
there is consensus in the field that it provides an acceptable measure with an adequate structure. 
The CCS is described as it has a theoretical basis for coping similar to the notion of affect 
regulation in that coping concerns the achievement of an optimal state when stress is 
experienced. These measures also exemplify functional strategies to reduce stress described by 
Miller (1992), such as reinterpreting threatening situations, engaging in activities to divert 
attention, seeking information about the source of distress. 
The Ways of Coping Checklist (WCC, Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) is based on the theory 
that coping involves reducing perceived demands after a threat is detected, then eliciting 
responses to this threat. The WCC comprises sixty-six items divided into eight coping behaviour 
scales. These scales are confrontive (e.g., I expressed anger to the person(s) who caused the 
problem), planful problem-solving (e.g., I made a plan of action ... ), distancing (e.g., Went on as 
if nothing had happened), positive reappraisal (e.g., I was inspired to do something creative), 
seeking social support (e.g., Talked to someone ... ), escape-avoidance (e.g., Tried to make myself 
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feel better by eating, drinking, .... ), accepting responsibility (e.g., Criticised or lectured myself), 
and self-controlling (e.g., I tried to keep my feelings to myself). Items are rated on a four-point 
scale from 'not used at all' to 'used a great deal'. Although the WCC has been used frequently, it 
has not demonstrated stability in its factor structure (Parker & Endler, 1992). Edwards and 
Baglioni (1993) also calculated internal reliability estimates on the eight proposed scales using 
data from 501 Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students. They found that only one 
scale exceeded an alpha level of .70 and that six ranged between .53 and .68, suggesting overall 
poor internal consistency within scales. 
The Cybernetic Coping Scale (CCS) (Edwards & Baglioni, 1993) was constructed on the 
theoretical assumption that coping involves attempts to modify the negative effects of stress by 
reducing the discrepancy between an individual's perceived and desired state. This approximates 
the concept of affect regulation although most CCS items focus on responses to address stressors, 
and not negative affect. It comprises the following five scales: changing the situation (e.g., 'I 
tried to fix what was wrong with the situation'), devaluation (e.g., 'I told myself the problem was 
unimportant'), avoidance (e.g., 'I tried to forget about the whole thing'), accommodation (e.g., 'I 
tried to adapt to th~ situation'), and symptom reduction (e.g., 'I tried to just let off steam'). Items 
are assessed according to how coping was achieved in a particular problem-area using a seven-
point scale ('Did not use at all' to 'Used very much'). Edwards and Baglioni administered the 
CCS to 501 MBA students according to how they coped with looking for their ideal job. 
Cronbach's alpha calculated for each of the scales suggested that accommodation had a reliability 
coefficient of .78 and the remaining scales had coefficients above .86, demonstrating higher 
internal consistency within scales compared to the WCC scales. Edwards and Baglioni, 
however, cautioned against using this measure in its current form as adequate reliability studies 
have not been conducted on a variety of samples. 
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Problems with the psychometric properties of these measures suggested that it was 
inappropriate to simplify modify existing scales in either the WCC and the CCS to reflect means 
of affect regulation for use in the present study. These measures, however, demonstrated that a 
diversity of types of items was required to achieve an accurate assessment of affect regulation. 
Primarily cognitive strategies were described as a means of approaching the identified stressor. 
Both the WCC and the CCS included items that describe problem-solving (in the planful 
problem-solving and changing the situation scales, respectively) and attempting to avoid the 
situational stressor (in the distancing scale in the WCC and avoidance scale in the CCS). Others 
focused on thinking about how to deal with the affective experiences rather than addressing the 
situation (self-controlling in the WCC and symptom reduction in the CCS). The WCC also 
includes several types of behaviour, such as expressing anger (in the confrontive coping scale), 
talking to friends (in the seeking social support scale) and religious activities (positive reappraisal 
scale), to cope with negative situational factors. 
Face Validity in a Prison Culture 
Good face validity of measures in the present study required consideration of the prison 
culture to ensure items were relevant and understandable. This issue was particularly important 
considering the experience of imprisonment is particularly different from what is generally 
experienced in society. Many factors might contribute to this such as the physical environment, 
involvement in the criminal justice system, dangers inherent to being imprisoned such as threats 
and violence, and personal vulnerability factors such as substance abuse and impulsivity (Toch, 
1992). Items in the AIM and questionnaires such as the WCC and the CCS are problematic in 
this respect. For example, the AIM was normed on U.S. college students and the vocabulary and 
style of language used assumes this educational level. Some of the terms used, such as 
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exuberance, euphoria and jubilance, and style of language in items such as 'When someone 
compliments me, I get so happy I could 'burst", are unsuited to the prison culture. Coping 
questionnaires similarly use abstract concepts and vocabularies that seem inappropriate for the 
present study such as 'I let my feelings out somehow' and 'Tried not to bum all my bridges but 
leave things open somewhat' in the WCC. 
In an attempt to overcome the potential problem of participants not understanding or 
identifying with the content of the AIM, items were altered prior to pilot testing on a prison 
sample. The style of language and vocabulary were simplified and situations were presented that 
were considered more relevant to prisoners. For example, the original item 'Sad movies deeply 
touch me' was modified to 'Sad movies get to me'. This modified AIM was administered to a 
sample of prisoners so that they could comment on the use of terms and relevance of item 
content. The modified AIM was then further refined and a checklist of affect regulation 
strategies was constructed on the basis of information provided by the sample of prisoners. 
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Method 
Participants 
Ten male prisoners, five Aboriginal and five Non-Aboriginal, from a West Australian 
maximum security prison participated. Ages ranged from eighteen to thirty-five years old. The 
prison psychologist, to avoid potential participants feeling coerced to participate if approached by 
an individual unfamiliar to them, initially approached prisoners. This process also ensured that 
prisoners' files were accessed by existing correctional service employees to retain the anonymity 
of participants. The psychologist was also available for referrals if prisoners appeared distressed 
during the interview. The psychologist was asked to select prisoners that might be interested in 
discussing the measures under investigation, and that did not have a history of self-harm recorded 
on their prison or medical files. Prisoners were asked if they were willing to participate in a 
research project that involved discussing some questionnaires on emotional reactions so that they 
could be improved for use in another study. 
Measures 
Modified Affect Intensity Measure (AIM(M)) 
The original AIM consists of items that describe the experience of different emotional 
states. A modified version of the AIM (Larsen & Diener, 1987) was constructed based on the 
forty original items within the four factors, identified by W einfurt et al. ( 1994 ), that were used as 
sub-scales. This modified AIM (AIM(M)) emulated the types of responses and situations posed 
in original items but drew on experiences, situations and terms with which it was expected 
prisoners could better identify. The AIM(M) was also designed to avoid repetition of items so 
that where several items described similar situations and affective responses in the original 
measure, the AIM(M) sought to include only one or two items of each type. Items were modified 
if terms considered more suitable for a prison sample could be substituted, or eliminated if no 
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feasible alternatives could be generated. Additional items were included that attempted to 
capture the features of one of the four factors described by Weinfurt et al .. 
The first factor identified by Weinfurt et al. ( 1994) was positive affectivity and 
comprised seventeen items in the original AIM reflecting high arousal positive affective 
states. Eight of these items described intense positive emotions (e.g., 'When I'm happy 
it's a strong type of exuberance') and the other nine items concerned positive reactivity, 
or intense positive affective responses to situations. Five of the positive reactivity items 
described accomplishments, such as 'When I solve a small personal problem, I feel 
euphoric'. Two were concerned with positive situations generally, such as 'When 
something good happens, I am usually more jubilant than others'. One item described 
anticipating an event, 'My heart races at the anticipation of some exciting event'; and 
another concerned sociability, 'I enjoy being with other people very much'. 
The original seventeen items in the positive affectivity sub-scale were modified or 
discarded for use in the pilot study resulting in a five item sub-scale in the AIM(M). Only one 
item described the general experience of positive affect as intense, namely 'When I'm happy, I 
feel pepped-up and excited more than calm and content'. The remaining items describing intense 
positive states in the original scale were considered inappropriate as terms included, such as 
exuberance, euphoria and jubilation, were incongruent with language used within prisons. The 
additional four items described positive reactivity. Items described situations similar to those in 
the original AIM including accomplishments ('When something happens that makes me look 
good, I feel really proud'), positive situations generally ('When things go right, I feel fantastic'), 
and anticipating a positive event ('I feel really hyped-up when something exciting is going to 
happen'). An additional item included in this sub-scale, not directly based on an original item, 
was 'When I feel romantic, it is an intense feeling'. 
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The second factor identified by Weinfurt et al. (1994) was negative intensity and 
comprised ten items in the original AIM that concerned intense negative affective experiences. 
Items included physiological responses (e.g., 'When I am nervous, I get shaky all over'), being 
over emotional (e.g., 'My emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people'), guilt 
(e.g., 'When I feel guilty, this emotion is quite strong'), anxiety (e.g., 'When I do feel anxiety it is 
normally very strong'), anger (e.g.' When I get angry it's easy for me to be rational and not 
overreact') and negative moods in general (e.g., 'My negative moods are mild in intensity'). 
Minor modifications to a number of items resulted in a six item negative intensity sub-
scale in the AIM(M). Items concerned experiencing physiological responses ('When I get 
nervous, I shake'), being over emotional ('I have feelings that are more intense than most other 
people' and 'My friends say I overreact'), anger (When I get angry, I still think straight and don't 
freak-out') frustration ('When I get fed-up, I feel really agitated') and negative moods in general 
('When I get upset, it's a really strong feeling'). The remaining four items in the original AIM 
were considered inappropriate as they described responses that may have created suspicion in 
participants. It was anticipated that-if prisoners were awaiting decisions for conditions of early 
release, they might have suspected that items describing experiences such as guilt and honesty 
were being used to assess remorse for their convictions. These items were therefore not 
included. 
The third factor identified by Weinfurt et al. (1994) in the original AIM was serenity, 
which comprised seven items that described low arousal positive affect, such as being contented, 
and relaxed. Five items specifically contrasted intense and serene affect such as 'When I'm 
happy it's a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than being zestful and aroused', and 
two items described accomplishments, such as 'When I succeed at something, my reaction is 
calm contentment'. 
Affect Intensity, Affect Regulation and Self-harm 32 
Five items were included in the AIM(M) that comprised the serenity sub-scale. These 
items also described accomplishments ('I feel quietly satisfied when people tell me I've done 
well') and general contentment ('When I'm really happy, I feel relaxed' and 'When I'm in a good 
mood, it's a mild feeling'). Items were also included that concerned remaining calm ('I stay calm 
even on days where everything goes wrong') and being calm in general ("Cool and calm' could 
easily describe me'). Items contrasting positive affect as serene compared to intense were not 
included to maintain consistency in style, as these comparisons were not made in other sub-
scales. 
The fourth factor identified by Weinfurt et al. (1994) in the original AIM was negative 
reactivity which comprised six items that described intense negative affective experiences to 
negative situations. Items described a variety of situations such as viewing sad movies ('Sad 
movies deeply touch me'), and responding to antisocial behaviour (e.g., 'I feel pretty bad when I 
tell a lie') and traumatic situations ('The sight of someone who is hurt badly affects me 
strongly'). 
Again, it was considered inappropriate to ask questions related to antisocial behaviour or 
traumatic situations to avoid participants believing pro-social responses were being assessed in 
relation to their offending. AIM(M) items that comprised the negative reactivity sub-scale 
therefore did not include these types of items and resulted in six items concerning negative 
situations. The original item 'Sad movies deeply touch me' was modified to 'Sad movies really 
get to me'. Alternative situations were devised that concerned being thwarted ('If someone stops 
me doing what I want to do, I feel really annoyed'), deceived ('I get really hurt when people I 
care about deceive me'), let-down ('When people let me down, I can handle it') and rejected 
('Being rejected makes me feel really low'). An item regarding responses to negative situations 
in general ('When something bad happens, I feel really down') was also included. 
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In the original AIM, participants are required to indicate the frequency with which they 
experience the affective states depicted in items on a six-point Likert-type scale from 'Never', 
'Almost Never', 'Occasionally', 'Usually', 'Almost Always', to 'Always'. In addition to this 
scale, another six-point Likert-type scale was included for prisoners to assess: 'Not at all', 
'Hardly ever', 'Occasionally', 'Often', 'Most of the time', and 'All the time'. 
The original instructions for the AIM were: 
The following questions refer to emotional reactions to typical life-
events. Please indicate how YOU react to these events by placing a number 
from the following scale in the blank space preceding each item. Please base 
your answers on how YOU react, not on how you think others react or how 
you think a person should react. 
These instructions were simplified for use in the pilot study to: 
The following statements describe emotional reactions in different situations. 
Please tell me whether these statements are true for you NOT AT ALL, 
HARDLY EVER, OCCASIONALLY, USUALLY, MOST OF THE TIME or ALL 
THE TIME. 
Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC) Categories 
A number of categories of strategies for regulating negative affect were generated to 
provide scales for an Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC) in the main study. To assess 
the validity of these categories, affect regulation strategies generated by participants in the pilot 
study were assessed against these categories. Discussion with participants about the types of 
strategies each category represented in the pilot study also determined whether prisoners could 
identify with each of the categories, despite whether they had elicited those types of strategies. 
Categories were based on scales used in coping measures (Parker & Endler, 1992, Folkman & 
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Lazarus, 1985, Edwards & Baglioni, 1993), particularly responses associated with regulating 
stress (Miller, 1992), and on dysfunctional processes associated with a history of self-harm (e.g., 
Wans tall & Oei, 1989, Shea, 1993). The categories selected for inclusion were cognitive, 
distraction, social interaction, and aggression. These categories sought to encompass the most 
typical means of regulating affect that would discriminate vulnerability to self-harm. A 
definition for each category was derived based on the research literature reviewed for each type 
of strategy, and to ensure that categories were mutually exclusive. These definitions were used to 
categorise items elicited by participants in the pilot ,study, and to calculate inter-rater reliability 
on finalised items for the ARSC. 
Cognitive processes were included as a category as previous research has suggested that 
individuals self-report problems with cognitive processes prior to an act of self-harm (e.g., 
Wanstall & Oei, 1989) and experience cognitive deficits following a self-harm incident when 
intense negative affect is experienced (e.g. Schmidtke & Schaller, 1992; Schotte et al., 1990). 
None of these studies, however, have assessed self-reported problems in cognition when intense 
negative affective states occur that are not necessarily associated with a self-harm incident. 
Moreover, Miller ( 1992) suggested that individuals predisposed to focusing on threatening 
aspects of a situation and who did not use strategies, such as reinterpreting their situation, 
retained high levels of stress. Numerous scales in both the WCC and the CCS also focus on 
various types of cognition. These include problem-solving strategies such as the planful 
problem-solving scale in the WCC (e.g., 'Came up with a couple of different solutions to the 
problem') and changing the situation scale in the CCS (e.g., 'I tried to change the situation to get 
what I wanted'). Other cognitive strategies described avoiding the source of stress, such as 
distancing in the WCC (e.g., 'Tried to forget the whole thing'), or minimising the significance of 
the stressor, such as devaluation in the CCS (e.g., 'I tried to convince myself that the problem 
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was not very important after all'). Other scales described attempts at coping with affective states 
such as the self-controlling scale in the wee ('I tried to keep my feelings to myself') and the 
symptom reduction scale in the ees ('I tried to relieve my tension somehow'). The cognitive 
category therefore embraced a diversity of cognitive processes invoked to reduce intense 
affective states. Cognition that focussed on stressors, such as active problem-solving and 
reinterpreting sources of stress, and cognition that focussed on affective states, such as tolerating 
the negative affect (e.g., waiting for the state to subside) and reducing these states (e.g., through 
relaxation), were included as strategies. The definition for cognitive strategies was 
strategies that require individuals to think about their situation, problem, or feelings in a 
way that has the effect of reducing their negative affective state 
Distraction was included as a category as Miller (1992) found that the ability to undertake 
activities that achieve a shift in attention from threatening situations subsequently decreased 
stress in numerous samples, and hence provides an important means of modulating internal 
arousal. Individuals predisposed to focusing on sources of stress tended not to undertake these 
activities and developed more somatic conditions (Miller, 1992). Although no research reviewed 
above on self-harm has focused on these activities, both the wee and the ees contain scales 
incorporating items concerned with distraction. Items that describe these types of behaviour are 
'Tried to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, using drugs and medication, and 
so forth' in the escape-avoidance scale of the wee; and 'I did something I thought would soothe 
my nerves' in the symptom reduction scale of the ees. Strategies that divert attention, from the 
situation or emotion experienced, to reduce negative affective states incorporate a wide range of 
activities such as watching television, reading, and using relaxation techniques. It should be 
noted that there is an overlap between distraction strategies and both social interaction and 
aggression strategies, which were also included as categories and may function as means of 
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distraction. The definition of the distraction category therefore excluded these strategies and 
was: 
non-aggressive strategies that effectively allow an individual to concentrate on 
another activity (that does not primarily focus on social interaction) and hence 
avoid/ignore their current state 
Social interaction and aggression were included as separate categories as both types of 
behaviour have been associated with self-harm. Particular focus on these responses was 
therefore important to determine whether prisoners with a history of self-harm could be 
discriminated on the basis of social withdrawal or increased use of aggression to regulate affect. 
Social interaction was included as a category as previous research has suggested that 
individuals with a history of self-harm have deficiencies in socialising. Prior to an act of self-
harm, for example, individuals may become socially withdrawn (Wanstall & Oei, 1989). MMPI 
results comparing prisoners with a history of self-harm with control prisoners also suggested that 
prisoners with a history of self-harm generally experienced more social alienation (Shea, 1993). 
This could mean that prisoners vulnerable to self-harm may be less inclined to attempt strategies 
that involve interacting socially to decrease intense negative affective states, although no 
previous research has explored this specifically. Seeking social support was also included as a 
scale in the wee based on factor analytic studies (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985) suggesting that 
this type of behaviour provides the basis for a separate scale. The social interaction category 
therefore concerned socialising as a means of distraction from stressors, or the use of social 
resources to assist with sources of distress. The following definition was used for social 
interaction: 
strategies that refer to an individual initiating behaviour with the purpose 
of interacting with other people 
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Aggression was included as a category as previous research has demonstrated that 
prisoners with a history of self-harm were more likely to act aggressively (Hillbrand et al .. , 1994) 
and have impulsive tendencies (Shea, 1993) compared to control prisoners. Libeling ( 1992) also 
found that juveniles with a history of self-harm experienced more conflict with other inmates 
compared to control participants. Although neither the wee or the ees contain scales that 
focus on aggressive behaviour, the wee confrontive scale contains an item that taps into these 
behaviours ('I expressed anger to the person(s) who caused the problem') but also describes other 
actions that do not involve aggressive behaviour (e.g., 'I did something which I didn't think 
would work, but at least I was doing something'). Aggressive behaviour may not have featured 
in these measures as they were normed on student samples, so the use of aggressive behaviours 
to cope with situations may not have seemed applicable within this context compared to a prison 
culture where violence is prevalent (e.g. Toch, 1992). The aggression category therefore sought 
to explore whether aggressive strategies were used as a means of affect regulation. Strategies 
included a broad range of behaviours including swearing, slamming doors, and hitting objects 
and people. 
The definition of aggression strategies was: 
strategies that refer to verbal or physical acts of aggression. 
Procedure 
The prison psychologist explained to potential participants that participation was 
voluntary and would involve looking at a questionnaire and discussing emotional responses so 
the information could be used in another study with other prisoners. Willing participants were 
directed, individually or up to three at a time, to an interview room where they were again 
informed of the purpose of the study. They were also again told that participation was voluntary 
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and could be withdrawn at anytime. They were then asked if they had any queries, and required 
to sign an informed consent form if they wished to participate. 
Participants were then given printed copies of the AIM(M) and asked to read the 
directions. Participants were told they could comment on the measure in general or on individual 
items as they completed it. They were asked whether they had any questions before being 
requested to complete the AIM(M). Half of the participants were presented with the original 
scale and half with the alternative. On completion, they were interviewed regarding their general 
impressions of the measure and again asked whether they had any comments on individual items. 
They were then presented with the scale they had not used and asked if they had a preference for 
the two response scales. 
Participants were then asked to list the things that they do to make themselves feel better 
when they experience intense negative emotions, such as stress, anger or depression. Participants 
were then asked whether they, or other prisoners they knew, engaged in the types of behaviour 
represented by the cognitive, distraction, social interaction and aggression categories to reduce 
stress, anger, depression, or other negative emotions. 
Participants responses were then examined, and AIM(M) sub-scales were refined and the 
scales of the ARSC were constructed. An independent rater then categorised items in both 
measures. Items for each of the AIM(M) sub-scales were categorised using the following 
information from Weinfurt et al.' s (1994) description of the four factors of the AIM: positive 
affectivity concerns all positive affective experiences with high arousal, such as happiness, and 
includes positive affective responses to positive situations; negative intensity concerns the 
experience of negative affect in general, including high arousal, but not in response to negative 
situations; serenity concerns positive affect with low arousal, such as relaxation; negative 
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reactivity concerns negative affective responses but only to negative situations. Scales for the 
ARSC items were categorised using the definitions given in the Measures section above. 
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Results 
Participants generally found the AIM(M) easy to understand and complete. Feed-back 
from responses to AIM(M) items resulted in six items being discarded and an additional six 
modified resulting in a sixteen item measure. Participants elicited a range of strategies used to 
regulate intense negative affective states that matched cognitive, distraction, social interaction, or 
aggression categories. They were also able to identify with these categories, so items were 
constructed for the ARSC using these categories. This resulted in a thirty item measure. Inter-
rater reliability measures for the AIM(M) and the ARSC suggested that items in both measures 
demonstrated good reliability for each of the sub-scales and scales. 
Participants worked through AIM(M) items quickly and said they did not find items 
confusing or difficult to understand although several participants made similar comments 
regarding the content of some items. On the basis of these comments, and where otherwise 
considered appropriate after reviewing the AIM(M), several items were rejected or modified. Of 
the five items in the positive affectivity sub-scale, the item 'When I feel romantic, it is an intense 
feeling' was discarded as several participants stated that romance could only elicit an intense 
feeling, which made the statement seem illogical. 
Four of the six items from the negative intensity sub-scale were modified. One item were 
considered difficult to rate also because intense responses were perceived as self-evident in the 
item 'When I get upset, it's a really strong feeling' which was modified to 'When I feel down, I 
get really upset'. A minor modification was made to the item 'When I get fed-up, I feel really 
agitated', to 'When I'm fed-up, I feel really agitated' to reflect a more pervasive mood. Several 
participants found the item 'My friends say I overreact' from this sub-scale difficult to rate as 
they were uncertain what their friends thought so this item was changed to 'I tend to overreact to 
things'. 'I have feelings that are more intense than most other peoples' also from the negative 
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intensity sub-scale was modified to 'I get stressed-out more than most other people' to focus on 
anxiety rather than more potentially confronting affective experiences such as love and hate. 
Most participants stated that items describing positive affective states as being typically 
mild in the serenity sub-scale ('When I'm in a good mood, it's a mild feeling.' 'When I'm really 
happy, I feel relaxed.') were nonsensical because these positive affective experiences were 
perceived as quite different from the experience of relaxation and serenity. These items were 
subsequently discarded resulting in a three item sub-scale. Of these three items, ''Cool and 
calm' could easily describe me' was modified to ''Laid back' could easily describe me' to 
eliminate the potential for participants to respond to the image of being 'cool', rather than a 
serene experience. 
Another three items in the negative reactivity sub-scale ('I get really hurt when people I 
care about deceive me'; 'Being rejected makes me feel really low' and 'When something bad 
happens I feel really down') were also eliminated, again because they seemed self-evident, 
resulting in a three item sub-scale. 'When people let me down I can handle it' from this sub-
scale was also modified to 'People that let me down really get to me' to more clearly describe an 
affective experience rather than ability to tolerate rejection. These modifications resulted in a 
sixteen item AIM(M) (four items in positive affectivity, six items in negative intensity, three 
items in serenity and three items in negative reactivity sub-scales). Seven of the ten participants 
also preferred the scale with anchor points from 'not at all' to 'hardly ever' for the AIM(M) 
rather than 'never' to 'always'. 
An independent rater then catgorised each item into one of the four sub-scales. This 
procedure resulted in all sixteen items being correctly categorised. The AIM(M) was therefore 
considered to have good inter-rater reliability. Although the number of items in sub-scales was 
small, the procedures undertaken to ensure the face validity of items and reliability of sub-scales 
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suggested that it was appropriate for use in the main study. 
Participants elicited between three and twelve affect regulation strategies that were 
matched to one of cognitive, distraction, social interaction or aggression categories based on the 
above definitions. Most participants stated that being able to communicate with others within the 
prison, on the telephone, or at visits was an important means of reducing negative affective 
experiences (social interaction category). Most also listed a number of activities undertaken to 
reduce negative affect, particularly sporting activities or watching television (distraction 
category). Several responses focused on aggressive strategies such as abusing people or objects. 
For three participants, being able to control their emotions with cognitive strategies, such as 
focussing on regaining control or avoiding aversive states, were central to their means of affect 
regulation. Discussion with participants regarding these categories also revealed that although 
not all participants used all types of strategies, they believed that others they knew in the prison 
did. Most notably, several participants did not generally use cognitive strategies and most did 
not currently use aggression, although they stated that they used aggressive strategies when they 
were younger. All elicited responses could be categorised and, because there was consensus on 
each category describing affect regulation strategies that were used within a prison population, no 
additional categories were considered for the main study. 
A thirty item Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC) was derived based on 
participants' responses and by simplifying items in the WCC and CCS for each of the cognitive, 
distraction, social interaction and aggression categories. Eight items comprised cognitive 
strategies. These included items that focused on problem-solving ('I try and work out a way to 
do something about the problem'), cognitive avoidance ('Instead of worrying, I try to think about 
other things'), and reinterpreting situational stressors ('I think about the situation in a different 
way so it doesn't seem so bad'). Five items focused on cognitive control of affective experiences 
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('I tell myself that there's no use feeling this way'; 'I concentrate on trying to relax'; 'I 
concentrate on trying to think clearly'; 'I stop myself before I get intensely stressed or 
depressed') and tolerating intense negative affect ('I tell myself to ride it through because it will 
pass'). 
Twelve non-aggressive distraction strategies that did not involve social interaction 
comprised the distraction scale. Strategies included leisure activities such as 'I read', 'I do 
sporting activities', 'I watch t.v.', 'I use a relaxation technique', and 'I go and do something like 
a drawing or a painting'. Two items concerned turning to religious activities ('I read a Bible' and 
'I pray') and one concerned working ('I go and work really hard'). The range of activities also 
included less active strategies such as 'I cry', 'I go somewhere to be alone', and substance use ('I 
get drunk' and 'I take other drugs'). 
The social interaction scale comprised four items. Two items concerned using social 
interaction as a means of distraction which were 'I try and joke around with my friends' and 'I do 
other things with my friends'. The remaining two items concerned engaging social interaction to 
assist in the source of stress and we~e 'I try and get someone else to help me do something about 
the problem' and 'I talk to friends about my problems'. 
Six items were included in the aggression scale. Three of these described strategies 
directed at objects ('I slam doors'; 'I take it out on my belongings'; 'I throw things'). The 
remaining three described aggressive actions that were directed towards others ('I verbally abuse 
other people'; 'I hit other people'; 'I yell',). 
An independent rater was asked to categorise items in the ARSC using the above 
definitions and there was disagreement on only one item suggesting good reliability for 
items in each of the scales. The only item not categorised correctly was 'I concentrate on 
trying to relax' from the cognitive category, which was classified by the independent rater 
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as a distraction strategy. The term 'concentrate', however, suggested that this item 
focused on cognitive processing, hence it was retained in the cognitive scale. 
Participants 
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CHAPTER THREE - THE MAIN STUDY 
Method 
Two samples of male prisoners, a self-harm group and a control group, were 
selected from two maximum security prisons in Western Australia. To preserve 
prisoners' privacy by limiting file access to existing correctional employees and retaining 
prisoners' anonymity, potential participants were selected by the prisons' psychologists 
based on their knowledge of prisoners and cross-checking information on files. 
Psychologists involved in selection were also available for referrals if participants 
appeared distressed during the interview. 
Psychologists approached every prisoner who met the criteria for the self-harm 
group over a two and a half-month period. Prisoners for the self-harm group were 
required to have committed at least two acts of self-harm while in prison or in the 
community (the most recent act within a year), but to be assessed as not currently at risk 
of self-harm. This was to minimise the risk of prisoners being coerced into participating 
by virtue of their vulnerable state. Self-harm was defined as the act of intentionally 
inflicting harm on oneself resulting in injuries that require medical attention. Self-report 
was used to determine whether these acts were intentional rather than accidental through· 
interviews by the prison psychologists, although at times that were not connected to the 
present study. Suicidal intent was not considered as this information is variably available 
in prison records and the purpose of the current study was to examine individual 
difference characteristics in prisoners vulnerable to self-harm regardless of intent. The 
prison psychologist was asked to select matched participants for the control group who 
Affect Intensity, Affect Regulation and Self-harm 46 
did not have a known history of self-harm. Control prisoners were matched with self-
harm prisoners according to prison, race (Aboriginal Australian, or not), and age. Age 
was matched by finding a prisoner on the muster with a date of birth as close as possible 
to that of the self-harm prisoners'. 
Forty prisoners, twenty in each group, participated. Fifteen from each group were 
tested in one prison and five from each group were tested in the other. Seven from each 
group were identified as Australian Aboriginal and thirteen as Non-Aboriginal. Age was 
calculated for each prisoner in years and months. The mean age for the self-harm group 
was 24 years (SD=3.37) and the mean age for the control group was 24.1 years 
(SD=3.85). No additional information regarding prisoners who participated was sought 
to respect the confidentiality of the information on prisoners' files. 
Measures 
Modified Affect Intensity Measure (AIM(M)) 
The final version of the AIM(M) comprised sixteen items that assessed four 
dimensions of affect intensity, as described in the pilot study in Chapter Two. Four items 
assessed positive affectivity (all positive affective experiences with high arousal), six 
items assessed negative intensity (general negative affective experiences, including those 
with high arousal), three items assessed serenity (positive affective experiences with low 
arousal) and three items assessed negative reactivity (intense negative affective 
experiences to situational stressors). Each item described a common affective experience 
and participants were required to rate how often they typically experienced this reaction 
on a frequency scale. The frequency scale was a six-point Likert-type scale, each which 
had corresponding label and numerical values: 'not at all' (0), 'hardly ever' (1), 
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'occasionally' (2), 'often' (3), 'most of the time' (4) and 'all the time' (5). Each of the 
scale labels and their corresponding numbers were printed across a white A4 page. 
Verbal instructions given to participants when the scale was first presented were: 
For the first part of this interview I'm going to read some statements to 
you and ask you to use this scale to answer them. Have you used a scale 
like this before? .... This scale allows you to choose how often you 
experience what's described in the statements; you can select from 'not 
at all' to 'all the time'. The following statements describe emotional 
reactions to different situations. Please tell me whether these statements 
are generally true for you not at all, hardly ever, occasionally, usually, 
most of the time, or all the time. You can use either the words or the 
numbers in the scale to answer the statements. Do you understand? 
After re-coding reverse worded items and averaging across items, the 
possible range of scores for each of the sub-scales was O - 5 with high scores 
corresponding to the frequent experience of: (a) positive affect with high arousal 
(positive affectivity); (b) intense negative affect in general, including high 
arousal (negative affectivity); ( c) a lack of positive affect with low arousal (lack 
of serenity, with low scores corresponding to the frequent experience of low 
arousal positive states such as relaxation); and (d) intense negative affective 
responses to situational stressors (negative reactivity). 
Global Affect Intensity Measure 
A global affect intensity measure was also administered as an overall measure of 
affect intensity and as a validity check for the AIM(M). It required participants to self-
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assess their emotional responsiveness in general. Responses were made on a scale from 
'Mildly', which had a value of 1, to 'Intensely', which had a value of 10. These anchors 
and the numbers from 1 to 10 were printed across a white A4 page, and no other numbers 
were assigned labels. Responses were participants' global affect intensity scores. 
Instructions given to participants were 
On a scale from one to ten, do you think you're a person who reacts 
intensely to things, or do you have fairly mild reactions? 
Affect Regulation Strategy Checklist (ARSC) 
The final version of the ARSC comprised thirty affect regulation strategies. These 
strategies described processes by which participants might decrease intense negative 
affective states. Strategies were rated against the frequency scale used in the 
administration of the AIM(M) and an effectiveness scale. The effectiveness scale was a 
six-point Likert-type scale with indicators of 'useless' (0), 'not much good' (1), 'fair' (2), 
'good' (3), 'very good' (4), to 'excellent' (5). Each of the scale labels for this scale, and 
their corresponding numbers, were also printed across a white A4 page. 
Participants were given the following instructions: 
The following statements describe things you might do to make yourself 
feel better when you feel bad, like being depressed, stressed or angry. 
First state how often you use each technique with the scale that you used 
earlier: not at all, hardly ever, occasionally, usually, most of the time, or 
all the time. Again, you can use either the words or the numbers in the 
scale. Then state how good each technique is at making you feel better 
using this other scale: useless, not much good, fair, good, very good or 
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excellent. Again, you can use either the words or the numbers in the 
scale. Do you understand? 
As described in Chapter 2, the thirty items in the ARSC comprised four 
categories: cognitive, distraction, social interaction and aggression. Eight items referred 
to cognitive strategies, defined as strategies that require an individual to think about their 
situation, problem or feelings in a way that has the effect of reducing their negative 
affective state (e.g., 'I tell myself there's no use feeling this way'). These items focused 
on cognitive processes to reduce the intense affective response either by promoting 
relaxation, reframing the problem, diverting attention from the situation, or problem-
solving. Twelve items described an array of distraction techniques, defined as non-
aggressive strategies that effectively allow an individual to concentrate on another activity 
( other than those primarily involving social interaction), and hence avoid or ignore the 
aversive nature of their current state. These items described behaviour ranging from 
watching television, participating in sporting activities, or reading, through to taking 
drugs or alcohol, and engaging in religious activities such as praying. Four items referred 
to social interaction, defined as strategies that require an individual initiating behaviour 
with the purpose of interacting with other people (e.g., 'I try and joke around with my 
friends'). Additional interaction items encompassed other activities undertaken with 
friends and also seeking help from people. Six items referred to aggressive strategies 
defined as strategies that describe verbal or physical acts of aggression. Aggressive 
strategies included verbal abuse, yelling and hitting people, and throwing objects (e.g., 'I 
take it out on my belongings'). Scores for each of the scales were obtained by calculating 
the product of the frequency and effectiveness scale scores, then taking the mean of these 
scores for items in each scale. 
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Procedure 
Prisoners selected by the prison psychologist were invited to participate 
voluntarily in a university study on how people experience emotions and react to stressful 
situations. Prisoners were individually directed to an interview room where the purpose 
of the study was reiterated and they were informed that participation involved an 
interview that would take about fifteen minutes. They were again informed that 
participation was voluntary, that they could withdraw at any time, and that individual 
responses would not be made available to prison administrators, or used in reports about 
the study. Prisoners were then asked if they had any queries and required to sign an 
informed consent form. 
In each interview both measures of affect intensity, the AIM(M) and the global 
affect intensity measure, and the ARSC were administered. Instructions were given 
verbally and responses were recorded on answer sheets. Participants were first presented 
with the frequency scale and given the instructions to the AIM(M). AIM(M) items were 
then read to participants who rated each consecutively according to how frequently they 
had that experience in the situation described. On completion of the AIM(M), 
participants were presented with the global affect intensity scale and asked to rate their 
overall affect intensity between 1 and 10. Participants were then given the instructions to 
the ARSC. After each item was read to participants, they rated the strategy according to 
how often it was used when intense negative affect was experienced. If the strategy was 
used, its effectiveness at reducing intense negative affective states was then rated before 
the next item was presented. All thirty items were administered. 
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Results 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. Two-tailed tests of 
significance were used for all t-tests. Although directional hypotheses were being tested, 
they were not so strongly supported by theory as to justify the use of one-tailed tests. 
Affect Intensity Measures 
The two measures of affect intensity were the sixteen item AIM(M), that had a 
Cronbach' s alpha level of .80, and the single item global affect intensity score. 
Participants mean AIM(M) scores for the four affect intensity sub-scales, positive 
affectivity, negative intensity, lack of serenity, and negative reactivity, were calculated by 
reverse-coding items that did not describe intense affective states. High scores on the 
sub-scales therefore corresponded to experiences of intense affective states or lack of 
serenity. Correlations between the four sub-scales are shown in Table 1. The positive 
affectivity 
sub-scale did not significantly correlate with any of the other sub-scales suggesting that 
the experience of intense positive affect is not associated with other types of affective 
experiences. Negative intensity and negative reactivity sub-scales were significantly 
correlated Cr (38) = .56, Q = .01) so the experience of intense negative affect in general 
was associated with the intensity of responses to situational stressors. Although the lack 
of serenity sub-scale was not correlated with negative reactivity, it was significantly 
correlated with negative intensity (r (38) = .55, Q = .01). A lack of serenity and relaxation 
was associated with the experience of intense negative affective states in general, but was 
not associated with responses to situational stressors. 
Mean scores for AIM(M) affect intensity sub-scales for both groups are shown in 
Table 2. The self-harm group had a higher affect intensity score overall ( M = 2.97, SD 
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= .64) than the control group (M = 2.08, SD= .44). Table 2 also shows that the self-
harm group rated their affective experiences and lack of serenity higher than the control 
group 
Table 1 
Intercorrelations Between Mean Scores for Positive Affectivity, Negative Intensity, (lack 





























on each of the affect intensity sub-scales. Scores were compared in a 4 x 2 mixed 
factorial design with affect intensity sub-scales (positive affectivity, negative intensity, 
serenity and negative reactivity) as the within subjects factor and group (self-harm and 
control) as the between subjects factor. This analysis revealed significant main effects for 
both the affect intensity sub-scales, E._(3, 76) = 33.44, .Q < .001, and group, E (1, 38) = 
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22.23, n < .001. The interaction between affect and group was also significant, f (3, 76) 
= 5.64, n = .003. Four t-tests for independent samples were conducted to examine 
the interaction. These t-tests showed that while there was no significant difference 
between groups for 
Table 2 
Mean Scores for Positive Affectivity, Negative Intensity, Serenity, and Negative 
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ratings of intense positive affect,! (38) = 0.16, n = .87, the self-harm group, compared to 
the control group, scored higher on lack of serenity,! (38) = 3.82, n = 001, and negative 
intensity,! (38) = 6.14, n = .000. There was also a trend for the self-harm group to rate 
items in the negative reactivity sub-scale higher compared to the control group, !(38) = 
1.92, n = .063. 
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Global affect intensity scores were also rated significantly higher by the self-harm 
group (M = 7.38, SD=2.21) compared to the control group (M = 4.45, SD=l.29), !._(30.59) 
= 5.12, Q < .001. However, the Levene's test also indicated greater variance in the self-
harm group than in the control group (f = 8.12, Q = .007). Thirteen participants in the 
self-harm group rated their overall level of affect intensity above 6, although none of the 
control group rated themselves above this score. As expected, overall AIM(M) scores 
and global affect intensity scores were significantly positively correlated (r..(38) = .78, Q = 
.00) supporting the validity of the AIM(M) as a measure of overall emotional 
responsiveness. 
Affect Regulation Strategies 
Participants rated items on the ARSC in terms of the frequency with which 
strategies were utilised and the effectiveness of each strategy in decreasing negative 
affective states. The correlation between participants' mean frequency (M = 2.05, SD= 
.61) and mean effectiveness (M = 1.89, SD= .61) scores across the 30 ARSC items was 
.84 (Q < .001). Due to the high correlation between these two ratings, analysis of ARSC 
items was conducted using the product scores of frequency by effectiveness ratings for 
each strategy to produce scores that reflect the overall utility of strategies for participants. 
These scores were summed and divided by 30 to produce an average ARSC score for 
each participant with a possible range between O and 25. At-test for independent 
samples was then conducted on average ARSC scores which showed no significant 
difference between the self-harm group (M = 5.97, SD= 2.63) and the control group (M 
= 6.83, SD= 2 69), ! (38) = 1.03, Q = .31. However, comparing participants' total scores 
may have obscured differences between groups in the types of strategies utilised. 
Additional analyses were, therefore, conducted surnrning across items. 
Affect Intensity, Affect Regulation and Self-harm 55 
Examination of group means for individual items showed a different pattern for 
the self-harm group compared to the control group. The latter had relatively high scores 
for some items and low scores for others, whereas the self-harm group tended to have 
more moderate scores for all items. Using item mean scores as 'case scores' in a 
Levene's test showed a significant difference in the variance among items for the two 
groups, E = 35.44, n < .001. As can be seen in Table 3, the mean ratings of items for the 
control group ranged from 0.25 to 15.70 compared to the self-harm group, that had a 
narrower range, from 1.70 (for 'I read a Bible') to 9.60 (for 'I take other drugs'). The 
self-harm group tended to rate all strategies more uniformly whereas the control group 
rated some items quite high and others hardly at all. T-tests for independent samples 
were calculated, as an exploratory analysis, to compare groups' ratings on each of the 
thirty items. Table 3 shows that the control group rated undertaking sporting activities 
and five cognitive strategies (e.g., 'I concentrate on trying to relax'; 'I concentrate on 
trying to think clearly'; 'I tell myself that there's no use feeling this way'; 'I tell myself to 
ride it through because it will pass';, 'I think about the situation in a different way so it 
doesn't seem so bad') significantly higher than the self-harm group. The self-harm group 
rated two items from the aggression category significantly higher than the control group. 
These were to use verbal abuse and throw things. 
Strategies were categorised, as described in the pilot study, into four scales: 
cognitive, distraction, social interaction, and aggression. Scales were devised on a 
theoretical basis, not factor analytic studies, so Chronbach's alpha was calculated for each 
to assess the reliability of scales. Poor internal consistency was found for the four items 
describing social interaction strategies (Chronbach's alpha= .43) and the twelve items 
describing distraction items (Chronbach's alpha= .64). However, high internal 
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Table 3 
Mean Scores of ARSC Items and t-values for the Self-harm and Control Group (Arranged 
in Rank Order for the Control Group}. 
Control Self -harm !-value 
(N = 20) (N = 20) 
Item M SD M SD 
Sport 15.70 7.66 7.48 7.44 3.45** 
Try to relax 12.25 7.42 6.75 7.05 2.40* 
Joke with friends 12.25 7.72 7.70 8.33 1.79 
Work hard 11.65 7.44 9.42 7.69 0.93 
Try to think clearly 11.40 8.31 5.95 4.85 2.53* 
Problem-solve 10.95 6.97 6.80 6.39 1.96 
Do things with friends 10.55 6.37 6.55 6.50 1.97 
Be alone 10.05 7.67 8.20 6.85 0.80 
Watch t.v. 10.00 6.18 6.80 6.11 1.65 
Say 'ride it through' 9.75 8.67 2.90 3.91 3.22** 
Think about other things 9.65 6.37 7.75 6.71 0.92 
Think of prob. differently 9.60 6.56 5.85 4.80 2.34* 
Relaxation technique 9.40 9.46 5.15 5.90 1.71 
Say 'no use feeling this way' 9.10 5.74 4.68 5.70 2.45* 
Take drugs 8.50 10.49 9.60 9.50 0.35 
Stop getting stressed 7.70 6.37 6.15 5.88 0.80 
Read 6.20 7.86 3.85 5.76 1.08 
Get drunk 5.35 6.23 7.85 10.07 0.87 
Talk about problems 4.40 5.20 5.45 7.80 0.50 
Yell 3.45 5.43 6.90 8.53 1.53 
Pray 3.10 6.54 1.90 4.44 0.68 
Draw/paint 2.60 4.86 5.85 7.70 1.60 
Get someone to help 2.35 2.35 4.10 4.15 1.64 
Read Bible 1.85 4.61 1.70 4.17 0.11 
Verbal abuse 1.80 2.19 6.90 9.28 2.39* 
Cry 1.65 3.91 4.15 4.58 1.86 
Slam doors 1.60 2.37 5.22 8.30 1.88 
Hit people 1.15 1.60 3.59 5.06 2.05 
Take it out on belongings 0.70 2.25 3.60 6.95 1.77 
Throw things 0.25 0.55 4.20 7.19 2.45* 
TOTAL 6.83 4.40 5.76 2.01 1.21 
Note: Possible range of mean scores is O - 25, !-test values compare self-harm and control 
groups, * 12 < .05 ** 12 < .01. 
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consistency was found for the eight items describing cognitive strategies (Chronbach's 
alpha= .86) and the six describing aggressive strategies (Chronbach's alpha= .87). Scale 
scores for the latter two categories were compared between groups. At-test for 
independent samples indicated that the control group rated cognitive strategies as 
significantly higher (M=l0.05, SD=4.86) than the self-harm group (M=5.79, SD=3.78), ! 
(38)=3.10, Q = .004. Results were reversed for aggression strategies in that the self-harm 
group (M = 5.07, SD= 6.04) rated these strategies higher than the control group (M = 
1.49, SD= 1.42). The t-test for independent samples adjusted for unequal variances was 
significant,! (21.1) = 2.58, Q_ = .02. The Levene's test showed that there was greater 
variability in the self-harm group's ratings of aggression items,!:= 16.68, Q < .001. 
Whereas for the control group the highest mean score for the six aggression items was 
five, scores for nine of the participants in the self-harm group ranged between five and 
eighteen. 
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Discussion 
The results from both measures of affect intensity, the AIM(M) and the global 
affect intensity scores, supported the hypothesis that prisoners with a history of self-harm 
generally experience more intense emotional responsiveness than their counterparts who 
have not engaged in self-harm. However, while prisoners with a history of self-harm had 
significantly higher scores on negative intensity and lack of serenity, and demonstrated a 
tendency for situational stressors to elicit more intense negative affect, the two groups did 
not differ in positive affectivity on the AIM(M). This suggests that intense experiences of 
negative affect and less serene experiences are pervasive in prisoners who have a history 
of self-harm compared to other prisoners, although these experiences are not coupled with 
significantly more intense experiences of positive affect. This also suggests that prisoners 
with a history of self-harm not only experience negative affect more intensely, but would 
tend to react emotionally more frequently and be more susceptible to physiological 
arousal compared to other prisoners (Larsen et al., 1986). The results of the present study 
therefore suggest that prisoners with a history of self-harm experience emotional !ability 
as they respond to more life events with more intense negative affective experiences, with 
infrequent overall experiences of serenity and calmness. These results are consistent with 
Shea's (1993) research that compared MMPI scores from forensic patients who had 
engaged in self-harm with MMPI scores from control prisoners. The self-harm group 
scored higher on scales that indicated they experienced more feelings of distress and 
alienation, reflecting erratic emotional experiences. 
An important implication of the results of the present study is that they provide a 
context for the interpretation of previous research. Individuals prone to self-harm appear 
to be also prone to experience intense negative affect that may reach intolerable levels in 
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response to particular stressors, thereby precipitating acts of self-harm. This is consistent 
with the conclusions drawn by Pattison and Kahan (1993). This high affect intensity can 
remain a salient factor, even though previous research has shown that intense affective 
levels decrease following an incident (e.g., Schmidtke & Shaller,1992; Schotte et al., 
1990). Schmidtke and Schaller (1992), for example, found that state measures of 
depression, hopelessness, and anxiety in participants who had attempted suicide 
decreased significantly, and were equal in intensity to their control group, several weeks 
following the attempted suicide. The present study suggests, however, that these 
individuals may none-the-less have a propensity to experience intense negative affect thus 
increasing the likelihood of future self-harm incidents. 
Individuals who experience high negative affect intensity should also experience 
acute and agitated affect if frequent situational stressors occur, resulting in less subjective 
well-being compared to individuals who do not experience high negative affect intensity 
(Larsen & Diener, 1987). Ivanoff and Jang (1991) demonstrated an association between 
negative situations, high levels of negative emotional states, and suicidal behaviour. 
They found that suicidal ideation and preoccupation with self-harm were mediated by 
previous and current situational stressors, such as a history of juvenile incarceration and 
having a long prison sentence imposed. These negative situations increased state levels of 
depression and hopelessness, that in tum affected suicidal factors. Although they 
suggested social desirability interacted with hopelessness to increase suicidal behaviour, 
the cognitive processes involved in social desirability were not clearly defined. Ivanoff 
and Jang' s study highlighted the complex relationship between stressors, emotional 
experiences, and self-harm. However, the present study has examined whether affect 
intensity is a pervasive characteristic indicative of vulnerability to self-harm that has 
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greater utility than assessing social desirability. It might be, however, that a propensity to 
experience intense negative affect and less relaxation manifests itself in less efficient 
cognitive functioning overall, although this was not specifically assessed in the present 
study. 
An additional factor that would seem to impinge on subjective well-being, 
however, concerns the use of effective affect regulation strategies. Results from the 
present study suggested that prisoners with a history of self-harm not only experience 
negative affective states more intensely, but responses to the ARSC demonstrated that 
they engaged in less efficient means of reducing intense negative affective states. 
Prisoners with no history of self-harm rated only some strategies on the ARSC quite high, 
such as engaging in sporting activities and trying to relax, suggesting that these prisoners 
tend to use a limited number of strategies, albeit efficiently. Prisoners with a history of 
self-harm, however, reported using a greater variety of strategies that had overall less 
utility compared to the control group. It seems that the self-harm group tended to attempt 
a variety of strategies but none were particularly useful. So, although intense negative 
affect associated with self-harm incidents decreases to normal levels in a matter of time, 
individuals vulnerable to self-harm appear to be less well equipped to deal with intense 
emotional states in a functional manner. This might be why self-harm becomes an option 
to decrease these aversive states, but might also be indicative of an overall pattern of 
harmful strategies used to reduce intense negative affect. This supposition is supported 
by previous research that has demonstrated factors symptomatic of poor subjective well 
being are prevalent in samples with a history of self-harm. Liebling (1992), for example, 
found that a reported history of drug and alcohol problems and psychiatric disorder were 
more prevalent among juveniles with a history of self-harm than among control group 
.. 
! 
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prisoners. Further to this, drug and alcohol problems and psychiatric disorder have also 
been associated with completed prison suicides (e.g. Dooley, 1990) suggesting that 
symptoms indicative of poor subjective well being, perhaps also as a result of ineffective 
affect regulation, might be pervasive in suicidal processes generally. 
Intense negative emotional responses are associated with cognitive processes that 
include overgeneralisation and personalisation in response to emotion eliciting stimuli 
(Larsen et al., 1987). These processes focus on the nature of the stimuli and are 
congruent with cognitive processes that occur prior to self-harm incidents (Pattison & 
Kahan, 1993), that involve an inability to divert attention from the negative situation and 
a desire to self-harm. This is also perhaps why prisoners who self-harm have been found 
to be more impulsive (Shea, 1993) in that intense affective states affect concentration and 
limit the ability to deliberate (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Previous research has further 
demonstrated that intense negative affective states in individuals who self-harm are also 
associated with poor interpersonal problem-solving skills (Schotte et al., 1990), rigid 
thinking, and field dependence (e.g.,. Scmidtke & Schaller, 1992). Focussing and 
elaborating on the emotive nature of stimuli might be more likely to occur in prisoners 
vulnerable to self-harm, rather than cognitive processes that are functional for regulating 
stress, such as reinterpreting or avoiding stressors that must be tolerated, or devising 
strategies to change the situation (Miller, 1992). 
The pattern of regulating intense negative affect reported by prisoners in the 
present study also provides greater insight into previous research that has suggested 
prisoners who self-harm have problems coping. Toch ( 1992), for example, asserted that 
an ability to harness stress differentiated prisoners who had not engaged in self-harm and 
attempted suicide. Survival within prison was determined by ability to engage strategies 
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such as utilising supports, taking a detached stance, and shutting off negative affect. The 
present study, however, suggests that the more critical skills involve strategies that utilise 
cognitive processes to facilitate a reduction in intense negative affective states. 
Liebling's (1992) notion that poor problem-solving ability in response to negative 
situations propels prisoners into self-harm is also supported in the present study. It seems 
that once intense negative affect is experienced, prisoners who self-harm are limited in 
efficiently reducing negative affect, although a range of cognitive skills may be affected 
in addition to problem-solving. Strategies in the cognitive scale in the present study 
included focusing on reducing the affective state, tolerating the affective state, or 
reinterpreting or avoiding the stressor, as well as problem-solving, to reduce intense 
negative affect. 
The present study has not determined whether the apparent deficiency in cognitive 
strategies in the self-harm sample is a result of the intensity of the negative affect 
experienced. A more intense experience may preclude cognitive strategies being 
engaged. Alternatively, when intense negative affect is experienced equally by both 
groups, those with a history of self-harm may not use cognitive strategies, perhaps 
because other strategies have been reinforced previously. It may even be that not using 
cognitive strategies results in a higher intensity of affect. Previous studies that have 
identified problems in cognition in individuals with active suicidal processes (e.g., 
Schotte et al., 1990; Schmidtke & Schaller, 1992), have not compared performance with 
control groups exhibiting equal levels of negative affect. Whether intense negative affect 
inhibits cognitive processes, or prisoners who self-harm have differences in their 
motivation or ability to use these strategies, is therefore worthy of further investigation. It 
might also be the case that when negative affect is at a very intense level, cognitive 
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processes are inhibited, but prisoners who do not self-harm are able to engage in 
functional activities. Most notably from the present study was the much higher rating of 
sporting activities by the control group as a means of decreasing negative affect. 
The present study also revealed that there is a tendency for some prisoners with a 
history of self-harm to also engage in aggressive strategies to reduce intense negative 
affect compared to those with no history of self-harm. These results are consistent with 
previous research suggesting that individuals who self-harm were likely to engage in 
more acts of aggression directed towards objects and people (e.g., Hillbrand et al., 1994). 
However, results from the present study further suggest that these behaviours are 
functional for some prisoners who self-harm in that they effectively reduce intense 
negative affective states. Although this response was not uniform in the self-harm group, 
an important concern regarding this finding is that the use of aggressive strategies is 
likely to result in an increase in negative situational factors with adverse consequences, 
such as retaliation and punishment. These situations are likely to increase the number of 
intense negative affective experiences encountered, thereby decreasing subjective well 
being, and increasing the likelihood of future self-harm incidents. In this respect, it is not 
surprising that once individuals engage in self-harm, a pattern of multiple incidents is 
frequently initiated (e.g., Hillbrand et al., 1994; Morgan et al., 1976; Wanstall & Oei, 
1989). 
Results of the present study are consistent with previous reported psychological 
experiences associated with self-harm incidents (e.g., Pattison & Kahan, 1993: Wanstall 
& Oei, 1989), that include intense negative affective states experienced in conjunction 
with cognitive constriction, or an inability to cogitate on matters other than sources of 
distress and/or self-harm. The present study suggests that when prisoners with a history 
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processes are inhibited, but prisoners who do not self-harm are able to engage in 
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of self-harm experience intense negative affect, cognitive strategies are less likely to be 
utilised to reduce this aversive state compared to those with no history of self-harm. This 
tendency to not use functional cognitive strategies appears to be pervasive and not 
restricted to those incidents involving acts of self-harm. 
These results support a transactional theory of self-harm that assumes that several 
factors related to a person's experiences and style of behaviour, in conjunction with 
environmental factors, determine risk of suicidal behaviour (Schmidtke & Schaller, 
1992). A modification of the transactional theory tested by Schmidtke and Schaller is 
proposed in light of the present study. Schmidtke and Schaller' s research did not support 
the assumption that individuals vulnerable to suicidal behaviour were predisposed to 
perceive the world as undifferentiated and inarticulated, so when situational factors 
elicited negative affect the probability of suicidal behaviours increased. While problems 
in cognitive functioning were evident when negative affective states were intense, these 
dysfunctional processes were not present when affective states returned to normal levels. 
However, the results of the present study suggest that vulnerability to self-harm is 
associated with a predisposition to experience high negative affect intensity. It might be 
that it is the intensity of the negative affect that causes dysfunctional cognition when it 
occurs. Self-harm behaviour might develop through a learning process in which self-
harm incidents are reinforced by positive consequences such as relief and attention from 
others when intense negative affective states are experienced. Further exploration is 
required, however, to investigate the relationship between cognitive processing when 
intense negative affect is experienced and self-destructive behaviour. Although intense 
emotional experiences are associated with elaboration of the emotional stimuli (Larsen et 
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al., 1987), the additional factors that play a role in the development of self-destructive 
behaviour from this experience are not clear. 
Assessment, Intervention and Management Implications 
The assessment of affect intensity and affect regulation might be useful for 
identifying individuals vulnerable to self-harm acts. To reduce the incidence of self-harm 
and suicide in custodial settings, this study suggests the employment of interventions and 
management strategies that specifically target prisoners assessed as high in negative affect 
intensity and with inefficient affect regulation. Administration of the AIM(M) and the 
ARSC are measures that might effectively detect prisoners vulnerable to self-harm. 
However, pending further research, these measures should be considered provisional. 
While the present study suggests that affect intensity may be a useful factor in 
assessing risk of suicidal behaviour, it has failed to find that affect intensity is a uni-
dimensional construct as proposed by Larsen and Diener (1987). Differences were found 
between the self-harm and control groups in their level of affect intensity for negative 
intensity and serenity but not positive affectivity and, accordingly, affect intensity as a 
construct requires further investigation. It could be that various other factors concerned 
with affect are more pertinent with respect to vulnerability to self-harm. One difficulty in 
the measurement of affect intensity, for example, concerns a possible confound between 
frequency and intensity. Measurement required the assessment of the frequency of 
intense affective experiences, hence being exposed to frequent negative experiences may 
have inadvertently affected individuals affect intensity score. 
A prospective study of the predictive power and psychometric properties of these 
measures is required to confirm the structure of the AIM(M) and the ARSC using factor 
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analysis. While there is no particular reason to suspect that differences found between 
groups were the result of biases in sampling, additional research on the ability of these 
measures to correctly classify vulnerability in a larger sample of prisoners is desirable. 
The ARSC in particular would benefit from reviewing its structure. Although the present 
study failed to find the distraction and social interaction scales reliable, it could be that 
the multi-dimensional nature of these behaviours requires more detailed assessment. 
Social interaction in particular would seem to be important to continue investigating, as 
social withdrawal has been associated with self-harm behaviour (e.g., Wanstall & Oei, 
1989). 
Assessments conducted to identify prisoners vulnerable to self-harm should also 
include criminological and other demographic factors, such as the type of offence and 
sentencing, which might impact on an individual's subjective well-being, that is also 
determined by their level of affect intensity. These factors are pertinent to assess acute 
risk, as demonstrated by Ivanoff and Jang's (1991) research that suggested that current 
suicidal tendencies were mediated by various criminological experiences and their impact 
on hopelessness and depression. Prospective research, therefore, is required using a 
number of predictive factors to assess the ability of the measures in the present study to 
correctly classify prisoners who engage in suicidal behaviour. Classification analysis, 
such as logistical regression or discriminant function analysis, is required with 
classification tables to assess the overall accuracy of the AIM(M) and the ARSC in 
identifying prisoners who engage in suicidal behaviour, and to ascertain the nature of any 
misclassification. Given the gravity of the consequences, the measures will have little 
utility if misclassification occurs for individuals who engage in suicidal behaviour, 
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compared to the categorisation of individuals as 'at risk' who do not engage in suicidal 
behaviour. 
The association between the experience of intense negative affective states and 
subsequent acts of self-harm, or other dysfunctional behaviour, can be addressed in 
clinical interventions by replacing the undesirable behaviour with an alternative 
behaviour that reduces this aversive state (e.g., Shearin & Linehan, 1994). Prisoners who 
self-harm might experience characteristically intense negative emotional responsiveness 
and less experience of serenity because of a physiological predisposition to under-arousal. 
The experience of intense emotional responsiveness therefore facilitates the achievement 
of arousal at base-line levels (Larsen & Diener, 1987). However, self-harm might have 
emerged through learning (e.g., Wanstall & Oei, 1989) as a means of attaining positive 
consequences to experiences of intense negative affect. Self-harm behaviour, however, 
might be replaced with other behaviour to regulate negative affect or achieve other 
desired consequences. In particular, the development of cognitive skills, anger 
management techniques, and promoting a repertoire of behaviours that reduce intense 
negative affect should reduce the incidence of self-harm. Results from the present study 
suggest, however, that an extensive repertoire of strategies to regulate affect is not crucial, 
but that a number of efficient strategies are required. 
The present study suggests that it may be useful to educate staff who manage 
prisoners about affect intensity and the tendency of prisoners with a history of self-harm 
to experience intense negative affect and less serene, calm states. This knowledge might 
be useful for anticipating incidents of self-harm. Prisoners with high affect intensity 
might perceive events as more dramatic than others would expect them to, although it 
might not simply be during the initial reaction when management strategies are required. 
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Pervasive negative affective states surrounding stressors are experienced more intensely 
by prisoners with a history of self-harm compared to other prisoners, and might play an 
integral role in precipitating self-harm incidents. Furthermore, prisoners vulnerable to 
self-harm may become more easily aroused and experience more mood variability (Larsen 
et al., 1986). This suggests that appropriate support provided to vulnerable prisoners 
when intense negative affective states are observed, particularly as their repertoire of 
functional affect regulation strategies may be limited, may reduce incidents. Staff also 
need to be aware that aggressive behaviour might be used by vulnerable prisoners as a 
means of regulating negative affect, so training in conflict resolution strategies might 
facilitate management. 
Results of the present study also suggest that when prisoners who are at risk of 
self-harm have limited or no access to activities that regulate affect, such as when placed 
in solitary confinement, they might not have the ability to reduce intense negative affect, 
thus increasing the probability of a self-harm incident. This phenomenon was described 
by Bach-y-Rita (1974) who observed that in a sample of prisoners with a history of 
violence, self-harm was more likely to be enacted when external controls evoked 
frustration. This emphasises the importance of prison managers ensuring that appropriate 
measures are undertaken to prevent intense negative affective experiences or to intervene 
when they occur. Promoting professional practice by staff, such as consistency in 
enforcing prison regulations and providing predictable routines, might reduce sources of 
distress. Assisting prisoners when intense negative affective states are experienced, even 
by promoting physical exercise as an appropriate means of regulating affect, might also 
assist in reducing the incidence of self-harm. 
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Conclusion 
The current study has suggested that tendencies to either experience intense affect 
or where intense affective experiences are not reduced, risk of suicidal behaviour is 
increased. Pending further research into validating measures of affect intensity and affect 
regulation, the present study proposes that awareness of the issues associated with these 
affective experiences will further assist clinical and correctional staff in reducing self-
harm incidents in custodial settings. 
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Appendix A -Measures Administered in the Main Study 
Modified Affect Intensity Measure (AIM(M)) 
DIRECTIONS: The following statements describe emotional reactions to different 
situations. Please tell me whether these statements are generally true for you NOT AT 
ALL, HARDLY EVER, OCCASIONALLY, USUALLY, MOST OF THE 
TIME or ALL THE TIME. 
NOTATALL HARDLYEVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN MOSTOFTHETIME ALLTHETIME 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
1. When I'm fed-up, I feel really agitated. __ 
2. When things go right, I feel fantastic. __ 
3. When something happens that makes me look good, I feel really proud. __ 
4. 'Laid-back' could easily describe me. __ 
5. When I get angry, I still think straight and don't freak-out. __ 
6. I get more stressed-out than most other people. __ 
7. When I get nervous, I shake. __ 
8. When I'm happy, I feel pepped-up and excited more than calm and content. __ 
9. If someone stops me doing what I want to do, I feel really annoyed. __ 
10. I tend to overreact to things. __ 
11. I stay calm even on days where everything goes wrong. __ 
12. People that let me down really get to me. __ 
13. When I feel down, I get really upset. __ 
14. I feel quietly satisfied when people tell me I've done well. __ 
15. I feel really hyped-up when something exciting is going to happen. __ 
16. Sad movies really get to me. __ 
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Global Affect Intensity Measure 
On a scale from 1 - 10, do you think you're a person who reacts intensely to things, or do 
you have fairly mild reactions? 
1 
Mildly 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Intensely 
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The Affect Regulation Strategy Check-list (ARSC) 
DIRECTIONS: The following statements describe things you might do to make yourself feel 
better when you feel bad, like being depressed, stressed or angry. First state how often you use 
each technique with the scale that you used earlier: not at all, hardly ever, occasionally usually, 
most of the time, or all the time. Then state how good each technique is at making you feel 
better: useless, not much good, fair, good, very good, or excellent. 
NOT AT ALL HARDLY EVER OCCASIONALLY OFTEN MOST OF THE TIME ALL THE TIME 
0 2 3 










How often How good 
1. I tell myself that there's no use feeling this way ........................... ___ _ 
2. I stop myself before I get intensely stressed or depressed ................ ___ _ 
3. I think about the situation in a different way so it doesn't seem so bad ___ _ 
4. Instead of worrying, I try and think about other things .................. ___ _ 
5. I go somewhere to be alone ................................................... ___ _ 
6. I read ............................................................................ ___ _ 
7. I try and joke around with my friends ....................................... ___ _ 
8. I cry .............................................................................. __ __ _ 
9. I go and work really hard ...................................................... ___ _ 
10. I do other things with my friends ............................................. ___ _ 
11. I talk to friends about my problems .......................................... ___ _ 
12. I do sporting activities ......................................................... ___ _ 
13. I go and do something like a drawing or a painting ........................ ___ _ 
14.Iwatcht.v ....................................................................... ___ _ 
15. Itry and work out a way to do something about the problem ............ ___ _ 
16. I try to get someone else to help me do something about the problem .. ___ _ 
17. I concentrate on trying to think clearly ...................................... ___ _ 
18. I concentrate on trying to relax ............................................... ___ _ 
19. I use a relaxation technique ................................................... ___ _ 
20. I take it out on my belongings ................................................ ___ _ 
21. I verbally abuse other people ................................................. ___ _ 
22. I hit other people ............................................................... ___ _ 
23. I get drunk ....................................................................... ___ _ 
24. I take other drugs .............................................................. ___ _ 
25. I read a Bible .................................................................... ___ _ 
26. I pray ........................................................................... ___ _ 
27. I yell ............................................................................ ___ _ 
28. I tell myself to ride it through because it will pass ........................ ___ _ 
29. I slam doors .................................................................... ___ _ 
30. I throw things .................................................................. ___ _ 
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Appendix B - Statistical Analyses 
R E L I A B I L I T Y A N A L Y S I S S C A L E 
Overall AIM(M) 
Reliabili t.y Coefficients 
N of Ca~:es 4 D. D N of It.em~: 
16 
Alpha = . 7957 
Overall AIM(M) 
t-te~:t.s for independent. samples ·of GROUP 
Variable 
AIM 
Mon self harrn 










• 4 4 :! 
.639 
(A L P H A) 
SE of Mean 
.099 
.143 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.389 P= .246 
t-test for Equality of Hean:3 





. 0 0 Ci 
.000 




CI for Diff 
(-1.24:J, -.S,.19) 
(-1.244, -.537) 
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Analysis of Variance of AlM(M) subscales (positive affectivity, negative intensity, serenity, negative 
reactivity) between groups (self-hann and oontrol) 
Within-Subjects Factors 










GROUP 0 Non self 20 harm 
1 Self harm 20 
Descriptive Statistics 
Std. 
GROUP Mean Deviation N 
NEGINT Non self 1.3333 .5948 20 harm 
Self harm 2.8833 .9599 20 
Total 2.1083 1.1123 40· 
· NEGREAGT Non self 2.6000 1.1476 20 harm 
Self harm 3.2833 1.1044 20 
Total 2.9417 1.1643 40 
POSITIVE Non self 3.3875 .7586 20 harm 
. 
Self harm 3.4313 .9a85 20 
Totaf 3.4094 .8"26 40 
SERENITY Nonsetf 
.. 1.3000 - .5609 20 hsttn 
~ settharm 2,2'083 .9030 .20 
l1JW 1/1542 .. 8730 40 
-.. 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericltt 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Within 
Eosilon8 Subjects Mauchly's Approx. 
Effect w Chi-SQuare df Sig. Greenhouse-Geisser I Huvnh-Feldt I Lower-bound 
AIMCAT .694 13.440 5 .020 .852 I .942 I .333 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the layers (by default) of the Tests of Within Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: lntercept+GROUP 
Within Subjects Design: AIMCAT 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
-
Type Ill 
Sum of Mean 
Source Sauares df Square 
AIMCAT Sphericity Assumed 68.812 3 22.937 
Greenhouse-Geisser 68.812 2.555 26.935 
Huynh-Feldt 68.812 2.827 24.344 
Lower-bound 68.812 1.000 68.812 
AIMCAT* Sphericity Assumed 11.597 3 3.866 
GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 11.597 2.555 4.539 
Huynh-Feldt 11.597 2.827 4.103 
Lower-bound 11.597 1.000 11.597 
Error(AIMCA T) Sphericity Assumed 78.196 114 .686 
Greenhouse-Geisser 78.196 97.082 .805 
Huynh-Feldt 78.196 107.413 .728 
Lower-bound 78.196 38.000 2.058 
a. Computed using a~'.= .05 
1...,venfi'S Test of Equality of Error Variancel 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
NEGINT 3.254 1 38 .079 
NEGREACT 
- .267 1 38 .608 
POSITIVE 3.212 1 38 .081 
SERENITY 3.853 1 38 .057 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent 
variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: lntercept+GROUP 











Sig. Squared Parameter 
.000 .468 100.319 
.000 .468 85.431 
.000 .468 94.522 
.000 .468 33.440 
.001 .129 16.907 
.002 .129 14.398 
.002 .129 15.930 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE_ 1 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Type Ill 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square 
Intercept 1043.164 1 1043.164 
GROUP 25.367 1 
Error 43.365 38 
a. Computed using alpha = .05 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. GROUP 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
-
GROUP Mean 
Non self 2.1552 harm 
Self harm 2.9516 
2.AIMCAT 






Box's Test of Equality 
of Covariance Matrices' 






Tests the null 
hypothesis that the 
observed covariance 
matrices of the 
dependent variables 















































a. Computed u~ing alpha = .05 
b. Exact statistic 
. ',· 
c. Design: lntercept+GROUP 
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Multivariate Testsl 
Hypothesis Eta Noncent. 
df Errordf Sig. Sauared Parameter 
3.000 36.000 .000 .699 83.756 
3.000 36.000 .000 .699 83.756 
3.000 36.000 .000 .699 83.756 
3.000 36.000 .000 .699 83.756 
3.000 36.000 .000 .398 23.826 
3.000 36.000 .000 .398 23.826 
3.000 36.000 .000 ,,, ' .398 23.826 











T-tests comparing groups on positive affectivity, negative intensity, serenity, and negative reactivity on 
the AIM(M), and participants' means ARSC scores -- -
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Eaualitv of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Interval of the Mean 
F Sia. t df (2-tailedl Difference Difference Lower UDDer 
POSITIVE Equal 












































1.025 37.980 .312 .8637 .8424 -.8416 2.5691 
not 
r 
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T-test comparing groups on global affect intensity scores 
Variable 
GLOPJ,L 
Non c;el f harm 









SD SE of Mean 
1 ,-, c,--, • LO J 
2. 206 .493 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1::.115 P= .007 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq 
Equal 
un,.~qual 
- ~). l'.:: 
- 5. 12 
• ODO 
'JO. 59 • o O 0 






















,1. 4 0 0 
2. !) 11) 
SE of Mean 
. :367 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 35.439 P= .000 
t--test for Equality ,:,f Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig 
Equal 
Unequal 




SE ,:,f Diff 
95% 
CI for Diff 
(-.1:,9C, 2.t:4C1,i 
1;-.712, 2.8~;6) 
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T-tests comparing groups on scores for the thirty ARSC items. 
\lariabl 8 
Pl Tell InT::elf 













Levene'c: Tec:t for Equality of Variancec:: F= .101 
t--test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq 
Equal 
Unequal 


























Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .585 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq 
Equal 





SE of Diff 
1. 93:3 




P3 Think different 










4. 8 Cl 4 




CI for Diff 
(.764, t!.OJ36) 
(.764, E:.086) 
SE of Mean 




CI f,:,r Diff 
(-2.37,J, S.47:J) 
(-2.374, 5.474) 
SE of Mean 
1.466 
1. (17,J 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.559 P= .219 
t-test for Equality of 1'1eanc: 













CI for Diff 
(.570, 7.9:30) 
( .. 559, 7.941) 




P4 Think other things 











Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .140 
t-test for Equality of Means 









SE of Diff 
2.069 
2.069 
t-tests for independent samples of GROUP 
Variable 
P5 Be alone 













SE of Mean 
1. 424 
1. ~,O 1 
P= • 711 
9:':,% 
CI for Diff 
(-2.289, 6.IHJ9) 
(-2.2139, 6.089) 
SE ,)f Mean 
1. 716 
1. 5:11 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .288 P= .594 
t-test for Equality of Means 

















Mean Difference = 2. 350 0 
SE of Diff 
Mean 
6. 2000 






Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .660 
t-test for Equality of Means 




1. Cl :3 
38 




CI for Diff 
(-2.807, 6.507) 
(-2.807, 6.507) 
:3E of Mean 
1.759 
P= • 422 
95% 
CI for Diff 
(-2.064, 6.764) 
(-2. 076, 6. 776) 
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P7 -Joke with friends 











Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .:361 
t.-t.e::;t. for Equality of Means 








37 .. 7 )3 








Mean Difference = -2.5000 
SE of Diff 
Mean 






4. 5:3 0 




CI for Diff 
(-.591, 9.691) 
(-.:,91, 9.691) 
:3E of Mean 
.874 
1. 024 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.484 P= .231 
t-test. for Equality of Means 




-1. 86 ]7.09 
.071 
.071 
t-tests for inclepsndent sample.s- of GROUP 
Variable 

















CI for Diff 
(-5.227, .227) 
(-5.2'.'.:9, .229) 
:::E of Mea.n 
1.664 
1. 720 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .021 
t-t.est for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value elf 2-Tail Sig 
Equ.c,l 
Unequal 
.9J . 3 5fJ 
:.:7. 96 
SE of Diff 
2 .. :393 
95% 
CI for Diff 
(-?.621, 7.071) 
(-~'..621, 7 .. 071) 




PlO Thincrs 1,,.ith friends 










Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .046 
t-test for Equality of Means 







SE of Diff 
:2. 035 
t-t8:3t:3 for indepenclent :3arnple:o of GRDUP 
Variable 
Pll Talk friends 






M'c'an Difference = -1. 0500 
Mean 
4. 41)1)0 




Levene's Test for Equality of Variance:o: F= .417 
t-test for Equality of Means 







. .) u 
]3.09 









::J .. 2250 
Me.an 
15. 70 D 0 
7.47~:,0 





Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .271 
t-test for Equality of Means 




:; • 4 5 
.001 
• 0 Cl 1 
SE of Diff 
2. :3 ~37 
2. 3t:7 
:3E of Mean 
1. 424 
1. 4 '::,4 
P= .. S:32 
9~:,% 
CI for Diff 
(-.121, 8.121) 
(-.121, t:.121) 
SE of Mean 
1. 162 
1. 74 :! 
P= .522 
CI for Diff 
(-5.292, 3.192) 
(-5.3U, 3.213) 




Cl for Diff 
(3.391, 13.059) 
('.LJ91, U.0'::,9) 
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t-tests for independent :3amples of GROUP 
Variable 
P1:3 Draw 













SE of Mean 
l. OS7 
1.722 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 5.807 P= .021 
t-test for Equality of Means 
variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig :3E of Diff 
Equal 
Unequal 
-1. 60 3 ft 
-1. 60 32. 07 
Variable 
Pl4 TV 








Mean Difference= 3.2000 
Mean 







Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .155 
t-test for Equality of Means 






. 10 8 
t-test:3 for independent :3amples of GROUP 
Variable 
P15 Wc•rk it c,ut 














Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .157 
t-test for Equality of Means 











CI for Diff 
(-7.373, .t:73) 
(-7.398, .898) 





CI for Diff 
(-.7:35, 7.13.5) 
(-.735, 7.135) 
SE of Mean 
1. 55ti 
1. 4213 
P= .. 695 
9.5% 
CI for Diff 
(-.130, :::.430) 
(-.130, 8.4:JD) 
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Variable 
P16 :~:omeone else 












SE of Mean 
.525 
. 929 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 5.7DO P= .022 
t-test for Equality of Means 






3 Cl. 0 0 
. 10 9 
.111 




P17 Think clearly 














CI for Diff 
(-3.91D, .410) 
(-3.929, .429) 
SE of Mean 
1. 857 
1. 085 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 4.424 P= .042 
t-test for Equality of Means 








:rn . 61 

















Levene's Te:3t for Equality of Variances: F= .171 
t-tec:t f,:ir Equality of M1c;ans 




2.40 37. 90 
.021 
.on 
SE of Diff 
2. 2 :0:,: 
.-, • -., Go 
95% 
CI for Diff 
(1.095, 9.:::05) 
(1.06:.:, 9.t:37) 
SE of Mean 
1 .. 659 
l. 57 6 
P= .681 
95% 
CI for Diff 
(.:367, 10.lJ:3) 
(.'d67, 10.lB) 
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t-te:3t:3 fc,r independent :3arnple:3 of GROUP 
Variable 
P19 Relaxation 






Mean Difference= 4.2500 
Mean 
9. 400 0 
:',. 1500 
9.456 
5 .. 896 
:::E of l.,.Iean 
2 .114 
1.3H: 
Levene':3 Test for Equality of Variance:3: F= 7.692 P= .009 
t-t.est. for Equality of Meant; 








Non self ha.rm 
Self harm 
.. 0 96 





Mean Difference= -2.9000 
SE of Diff 
Mean 








CI for Diff 
(-.795, 9.295) 
(-.r:27, 9.J27) 
:3E of Mean 
• 50:3 
Levene':3 Te:3t for Equality of Variance:3: F= 8.418 P= .006 
t-t.est for Equality of Means 




-1. 77 22.94 .089 
SE of Diff 
1.U4 
1. 6:14 
t-tes ts fc,r inclependen t s arnples. of GROUP 
Variable 
P21 Verbal abuse 













CI for Di ff 
(-6.209, .409) 
(-6.2t:2, .4B2) 
SE of Mean 
• 4 90 
2. C,7 4 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variance:3: F= 27.810 P= .000 
t-test for Equality of Means 95% 
variances t-value elf 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
-------·-···----------·-·--·-----------·-·---·-------------------------------
Equal 
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Variable 
P22 Hit people 













SE of Mean 
.357 
1.132 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 10.314 P= .003 
t-test for Equality of Means 









• (I 52 
SE of Diff 
1.187 
1. H:7 
t-te:3ts for independent samples of GROUP 
\Iariable 
P23 Drunt 
Non self harm 












CI for Diff 
(-4.841, -.034) 
(-4.:::9::, .OH:) 
SE of Mean 
1.392 
2.252 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 9.242 P= .D04 
t-test for Equality ,)f Mean:: 
Variances t-value elf 2-Tail Siq 
Equal 
Unequal 
- . ::n 
- • )~)7 
\Tariable 
P2 4 Druq:3 








SE of Diff 
Mean 







CI for Diff 
(-7.660, 3.060) 
(-7.694, 3.094) 
SE of Mean 
2 .. ] 45 
2.124 
·--------------------·-----
Mean Difference= -1.1000 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .690 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq 
Equa.l 
Unr:,qual 
- . :35 • 730 
.no 
SE of Di.ff 
3.164 
3.Hi4 
P= . 411 
%% 
Cl for Diff 
(-7.506, 5.306) 
(-7 .. 506, 5.]06) 
Affect Intensity, Affect Regulation and Self-harm 91 
t-tes ts for independent samples of GROUP 
Variable 
P25 Bible 













SE of Mean 
1. 032 
.. 9]2 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .069 P= .794 
t-t.ec:t for Equality of Mean::: 

















Mean Difference= 1.2000 








4. 4 :16 
95% 
CI for Diff 
(-2.666, 2.966) 
(-2 .. 666, 2.966) 
SE of Mean 
l. 462 
.992 
Levene':3 Test for Equality of Variances: F= 3.190 P= .082 
t.-tec:t for Equality of Mean::: 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE (,f Diff 
Equal 
Unequal :13. 4 4 
. 51)1 
. '::,02 
t-tests for independent samples ,:,f GROUP 
Variable 
P27 Yell 













8 .. 534 
95% 
CI for Diff 
(-2.377, 4.777) 
(-2.:1'.:.i'.'), 4.795) 
SE of Mean 
l. 215 
1. ~I[!:,: 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 5.511 P= .024 
t.-t.est for Equality of Means 









:::E of Diff CI for Di ff 
----·-·····-·--····----------------------------
~.262 (-::J.031, l.131) 
(-8.0:1 9, 1 .. 1::19) 




P2 8 Ride it through 











SE of Mean 
1. 938 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 15.149 P= .000 
t-test for Equality of Means 






• 0 Cl:! 
SE .:,f Diff 
2 .126 
2 .126 
t-te:3ts for independent :3ampls,s of GROUP 
Variable 
P2 9 Slam ck,ors 






Mean Difference= -3.6250 
Hean 
1.6000 
::, • 2250 
SD 
2 .. ]71 
B. 2 9~.I 
9::,% 
CI for Diff 
(2.545, 11.155) 
(2.479, 11.221) 
:3E of Mean 
.530 
1. e:.s:::, 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 19.296 P= .000 
t-t.est for Equality of Means 




-1. c:::: 22. 0 r::: 
variable 
P30 Throw thin~5 













1. 92 9 
.550 
CI for Diff 
(-7.531, .2Eil) 
(·-7 .. 627, .377) 




Mean Difference -3.9500 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 19.766 P= .000 
t-te::t for Equa.1.i ty ,:,f lvJeans 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig 
Equal ~-. 4 :::, 
. ,j", 19.22 
.019 
• (1}'1 




CI for Di ff 
(-7.213, --.687) 
(,-7.3~~1, -.576) 
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Reliability scores for mean product scores (frequency x effectiveness scores) for interaction, 
distraction, cognition, and aggressive strategy scales on the ARSC 
Intera,:tion stratec:ries - product items 
Reliability Coefficients 
n of Cases 40. !J 
Alpha = . 4 30 4 
R E L I A B I L I T Y 
P.f-lial>:ili t·y7 Cc:,,sffic:ients 
I\T ,-., -f (--, '.:l c.• CC' ., .... .L ·.,·<....-<--' ·- .__, 
R E L I A B I L I T Y 
Cognitive strategies - Product 
Reliability Coefficients 
l\f of c-:ases 40.0 
Alpha= . 1357] 
R E L I A B I T T T Y 
N of Items 4 
ANALY'0 I::: 5 r: A L E 
A N A L Y S I S S C A L E 
N of Items 8 
A N A L Y S I :3 
.S C A L E 
aggressive strategies - product scores 
Reliability Coefficients 
N ,~,f Ca:,,es 40.0 N of Items 6 
Alpha =- .8732 
(A L P H A) 
(A L P H A) 
(A L P H A) 
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lj :,~,::: :: v:o:t::,::::::::le:t p:,::~:::s of Number Variable of Cases 
MEi'-J,JCOG 











SE of Mean 
1. 0E:6 
• !':4 4 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.266 P= .268 
t-test for Equality of Means 






• 0 0 4 
t-te:3ts for independent samples of GROUP 
A,:rqre:3:3ive str."teqie:3 - product mean sc,.:,u?s 
Number 




CI for Diff 
(1.475, 7.0411) 
(1.470, 7.049) 
SE of Mean 
-----~---------------------------------------------------
MEMJAGG 








6. 04'.::'. 1. 351 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 16.676 P= .000 
t-te:c;t for Equality ,:,f Means 







SE of Diff 
1. 3 B f:l 
95% 
CI f,)r Di ff 
(-6 .. J8B, - .. 767) 
(-6.46°1, -.690) 
?) 7? 
, j LI J 
)-<ol 
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